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Introduction
What are the requisite elements to convict an individual of aiding and abetting international crimes committed by
an organization? This form of liability question was the principal issue the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) addressed in its February 28, 2013 judgment overturning the
2011 conviction of General Mom6ilo Perigi6, the former head of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ), for aiding and abet-
ting war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.'
The Periid judgment is controversial 2 and serves as a reminder of the still-unsettled nature of international criminal
law's jurisprudence, given that even threshold questions lack consistent and coherent answers. Even more troubling
is that the Appeals Chamber of a different tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, has already affirmatively
rejected the Perigie formulation of aiding and abetting liability, 3 leading one commentator to claim that "[t]he frag-
mentation of international criminal law is well and truly upon us." 4
Background
Perigid's conviction in 2011 marked the ICTY's first judgment against a VJ official for crimes committed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.5 Beginning in 1993, Periid served as Chief of the VJ General Staff, the most senior VJ officer in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Between 1993 and 1995, the VJ provided military and logistical assistance to
the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Trial Chamber, with Judge Moloto dissenting, found Perigi6 guilty, as an aider and abettor, of VRS crimes in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica,6 including murder, inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians), inflicting serious
injuries, wounding, forcible transfer and persecutions as crimes against humanity, as well as murder and attacks
on civilians as violations of the laws and customs of war. Again with Judge Moloto dissenting, it also found Perigid
guilty, as a superior, for failing to punish Serbian Army of the Krajina (SVK) crimes in Zagreb, including murder
and inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as crimes against humanity, and for murder and attacks on
civilians as violations of the laws of customs of war.8 The Trial Chamber sentenced Perigi to a single term of
twenty-seven years of imprisonment.
The Appeals Chamber Judgment
On appeal, the majority largely followed Judge Moloto's approach in his dissent in the Trial Judgment and acquitted
Perigi for the VRS offenses in Bosnia and Herzegovina on a point of law and for the SVK offenses in Croatia
following a de novo factual review.9 Judge Liu dissented, arguing for Perigid's guilt along the lines taken by the
Trial Chamber majority.
It is the point of law-the elements necessary to convict Perigi6 of aiding and abetting international crimes com-
mitted by the VRS-which has engendered controversy. The Trial Chamber had determined that the actus reus of
Periid's aiding and abetting was "prove[n] based on the finding that VJ assistance 'had a substantial effect on the
crimes perpetrated by the VRS. .. ."'o In other words, the Trial Chamber did not require proof that the VJ's actions
in providing military support were specifically directed towards assisting the VRS crimes.
The Appeals Chamber disagreed, relying on Prosecutor v. Tadid, the first ICTY appeal judgment to address the
scope of aiding and abetting liability. The Perifie Appeals Chamber noted that Tadid had emphasized that "[t]he
aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration
of a certain specific crime [] and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime."" The
Appeals Chamber wrote that "[t]o date, no judgment of the Appeals Chamber has found cogent reasons to depart
from the definition of aiding and abetting liability adopted in the Tadid Appeal Judgment." 1 2
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The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that other ICTY appellate judgments addressing aiding and abetting liability
did not analyze the issue of specific direction, but found that those cases involved actions proximate to the crimes
of the principal perpetrators. The majority held that Perigi's assistance to the VRS had been remote from their
crimes, that the VRS and the VJ were independent of each other and located in different geographic regions, and
that there was no evidence that Periii had been present when the VRS planned or committed criminal acts.1 3 As
a result, the Appeals Chamber held that "explicit consideration of specific direction is required."' 4
Conclusion
For some, the majority's statement that its ruling "should in no way be interpreted as enabling military leaders to
deflect criminal liability by subcontracting the commission of criminal acts" rings hollow.' 5 At its core, however,
Periid re-examines the line between culpable and non-culpable assistance to a crime.' 6 Renewing reliance on spe-
cific direction may be a problematic way to draw this line, but critics should consider the ramifications of its removal
before dismissing specific direction as too high a bar. What if instead of General Periid providing assistance to
the VRS, the issue was of military assistance to Syrian rebel groups known to have committed war crimes?17
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1. The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
("Appeals Chamber" and "Tribunal", respectively) is seised of an appeal by Mombilo Perigid ("Perigi6") against
the Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber I of the Tribunal ("Trial Chamber") on 6 September 2011 in the case
of Prosecutor v. Momilo Perifid, Case No. IT-04-81-T ("Trial Judgement").'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
2. The underlying events giving rise to this case took place in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("BiH"
or "Bosnia") and the Republic of Croatia ("Croatia") in the period between August 1993 and November 1995.2
Starting on 26 August 1993 and through the rest of this period, Perigi served as Chief of the Yugoslav Army ("VJ")
General Staff, a position that made him the VJ's most senior officer.3
3. Perigi6 was charged with aiding and abetting crimes in the Bosnian towns of Sarajevo and Srebrenica for
his role in facilitating the provision of military and logistical assistance from the VJ to the Army of the Republika
Srpska ("VRS"). In this regard, the Indictment alleged that Perigi6 was responsible for the crimes of murder, exter-
mination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and persecution as crimes against humanity and/or violations of the
laws or customs of war.4 The Indictment further alleged that Perigi had superior responsibility for crimes committed
in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and the Croatian town of Zagreb. In particular, the Indictment alleged that PeriWid failed
to prevent or punish the crimes of murder, extermination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and persecution as
crimes against humanity and/or violations of the laws or customs of war.5 The Office of the Prosecutor of the Tri-
bunal ("Prosecution") subsequently chose not to pursue allegations that Perigid bore superior responsibility for fail-
ing to prevent crimes committed in Zagreb.6
4. The Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, found PeriWi guilty, as an aider and abettor, of the following
crimes that took place in Sarajevo and Srebrenica: murder, inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians, inflicting
serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer), and persecutions as crimes against humanity; and murder and attacks
on civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war. The Trial Chamber, Jud'ge Moloto dissenting, also found
Periid guilty as a superior for failing to punish the following crimes related to events in Zagreb: murder and inhu-
mane acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as crimes against humanity; and murder and attacks on civilians as
violations of the laws or customs of war. The Trial Chamber sentenced Perigi6 to a single term of 27 years of
imprisonment.9
B. The Appeal
5. Perigi6 submits seventeen grounds of appeal challenging his convictions and sentence. 10 He requests that the
Appeals Chamber overturn all of his convictions or, in the alternative, that his sentence be reduced." The Pros-
ecution responds that Perigid's appeal should be dismissed in its entirety. 1 2
6. The Appeals Chamber heard oral submissions regarding this appeal on 30 October 2012.'1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
7. The Appeals Chamber recalls the applicable standards of appellate review pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute
of the Tribunal ("Statute"). The Appeals Chamber reviews only errors of law that have the potential to invalidate
the decision of the trial chamber and errors of fact that have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.1 4 In excep-
tional circumstances, the Appeals Chamber will also hear appeals where a party has raised a legal issue that
would not lead to the invalidation of the trial judgement but that is nevertheless of general significance to the
Tribunal's jurisprudence.' 5
8. Regarding errors of law, the Appeals Chamber has stated:
A party alleging an error of law must identify the alleged error, present arguments in support of
its claim and explain how the alleged error invalidates the decision. An allegation of an error of
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law which has no chance of changing the outcome of a decision may be rejected on that ground.
However, even if the party's arguments are insufficient to support the contention of an error, the
Appeals Chamber may still conclude for other reasons that there is an error of law.16
9. Where the Appeals Chamber finds an error of law in the trial judgement arising from the application of an
incorrect legal standard, the Appeals Chamber will articulate the correct legal standard and review the relevant
factual findings of the trial chamber accordingly.' 7 In so doing, the Appeals Chamber not only corrects the legal
error, but, when necessary, also applies the correct legal standard to the evidence contained in the trial record and
determines whether it is itself convinced beyond reasonable doubt as to the factual finding challenged by the appel-
lant before that finding is confirmed on appeal.' 8 It is necessary for any appellant claiming an error of law on the
basis of lack of a reasoned opinion to identify the specific issues, factual findings, or arguments that an appellant
submits the trial chamber omitted to address and to explain why this omission invalidated the decision. 19
10. Regarding errors of fact, the Appeals Chamber will apply a standard of reasonableness. 2 0 It is well estab-
lished that the Appeals Chamber will not lightly overturn findings of fact made by the trial chamber:
In reviewing the findings of the trial chamber, the Appeals Chamber will only substitute its own
findings for that of the trial chamber when no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the original
decision. ... .] Further, only an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice will cause
the Appeals Chamber to overturn a decision by the trial chamber.2 1
11. A party cannot merely repeat on appeal arguments that did not succeed at trial, unless it can demonstrate
that the trial chamber's rejection of those arguments constituted an error warranting the intervention of the Appeals
Chamber.2 2 Arguments which do not have the potential to cause the impugned decision to be reversed or revised
may be immediately dismissed by the Appeals Chamber and need not be considered on the merits. 2 3
12. In order for the Appeals Chamber to assess arguments on appeal, the appealing party must provide precise
references to relevant transcript pages or paragraphs in the decision or judgement to which the challenge is made.2 4
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber cannot be expected to consider a party's submissions in detail if they are obscure,
contradictory, vague, or suffer from other formal and obvious insufficiencies.2 5 Finally, the Appeals Chamber has
inherent discretion in selecting which submissions merit a detailed reasoned opinion in writing, and it may dismiss
26arguments which are evidently unfounded without providing detailed reasoning.
III. AIDING AND ABETTING (GROUNDS 1-12)
13. The Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, found Perigi6 guilty, inter alia, for aiding and abetting: murder,
inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians, inflicting serious injuries, wounding, and forcible transfer), and
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds as crimes against humanity (Counts 1, 3, 9, 11, and 12); and
murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war (Counts 2, 4, and 10).27 All of these
convictions related to crimes unanimously found to have been committed by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
(collectively, "VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica").2 8
14. The Trial Chamber considered a broad range of evidence in assessing whether Perigi6 aided and abetted
the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. This evidence included, inter alia, the war strategy of the VRS lead-
ership. The Trial Chamber, specifically making reference to VRS objectives involving Sarajevo and Srebrenica,
found that this strategy encompassed the systematic perpetration of crimes against civilians as a military objective.2 9
The Trial Chamber also reviewed evidence regarding Perigid's role in implementing the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia's ("FRY") policy of having the VJ provide logistical assistance to the VRS, including the supply of weapons,
ammunition, fuel, and various other types of support.3 0 Finally, the Trial Chamber considered Perigi's role in facil-
itating the secondment of VJ personnel to the VRS, including the payment of salaries to and provision of benefits
for these soldiers, some of whom served as high-ranking VRS officers.3 1
15. The Trial Chamber further found, inter alia, that Perigid was informed about "acts of violence against Bos-
nian Muslims perpetrated in the BiH theatre of war [that] made Perigi6 aware of the VRS's propensity to commit
crimes" ;3 2 was aware of the essential elements of the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica; and was aware that
his actions provided practical assistance to these crimes.3 3
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16. Perigi6 contends that the Trial Chamber erred by holding that acts of an aider and abettor need not be spe-
cifically directed towards assisting crimes of principal perpetrators.3 4 He further contends that the Trial Chamber
committed a number of additional errors with respect to his convictions for aiding and abetting.3 5
A. Specific Direction
17. The Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, concluded that the actus reus of aiding and abetting was
proved based on the finding that VJ assistance "had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the VRS in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica".3 6 In assessing Perigi's liability as an aider and abettor, the Trial Chamber stated that
"'specific direction' is not a requisite element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting", citing the Mrkgid and
9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement. Relying on that appeal judgement, the majority of the Trial Chamber did not
consider whether aid from the VJ to the VRS was specifically directed to the commission of crimes. 38
1. Submissions
18. Perigi6 asserts, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber erred in law by convicting him for aiding and abetting
without requiring proof that his acts were specifically directed towards assisting the crimes of principal perpetra-
tors.39 In particular, Perigi6 avers that the Trial Chamber relied on the Mrkid and 9ljivan~anin Appeal Judgement
to support its finding that specific direction was not an element of aiding and abetting liability.40 However, he sub-
mits that the Mrklid and 9ljivanjanin Appeal Judgement erroneously interpreted the Blagojevi and JokiW Appeal
Judgement in holding that a conviction for aiding and abetting did not require proof of specific direction.4 1 Perii6
contends that specific direction was included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting in the Tadi6
Appeal Judgement, and that this element distinguishes aiding and abetting from liability for participation in a Joint
Criminal Enterprise ("JCE"), a mode of liability that does not require specific direction.4 2 He also maintains that
the specific direction element of aiding and abetting liability is distinct from the "substantial effect" element.4 3
19. Perigid further asserts that specific direction was included as an element of aiding and abetting in appeal
judgements of the Tribunal prior to the Mrki6 and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement, and in appeal judgements of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") both before and after the MrkSid and ljivanjanin Appeal
Judgement.44 He maintains that the Mrkli6 and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement's approach to specific direction is
thus "strikingly inconsistent with the Tribunal's jurisprudence and should be rejected."4 5 Moreover, even if the
Appeals Chamber affirms the Mrkli6 and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement's approach to specific direction, Perigii
asserts that in cases such as this, where "remote conduct" is at issue, specific direction should be a requirement in
order to establish the actus reus for aiding and abetting.4 6 He maintains that the Trial Chamber's approach effectively
"amounts to a form of strict liability" where "to in any way assist the VRS in their conduct of hostilities was to
aid and abet their criminal acts."4 7
20. Perigi6 submits that his acts were not specifically directed towards providing VJ aid to the VRS crimes. He
contends that, although he facilitated the provision of aid to the VRS, this was general assistance directed towards
a war effort4 8 and that, in any event, he could not have stopped the flow of assistance.4 9 He maintains, inter alia,
that the Trial Chamber could not link his support of the VRS with the specific weapons used to commit relevant
crimes50 and that all but three individuals who held key positions within the VRS held those positions prior to his
appointment as Chief of the VJ General Staff.5 1 Perigi6 requests that the Appeals Chamber "reverse the Trial Cham-
ber's judg[e]ment and enter an acquittal."5 2
21. The Prosecution responds, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber did not err in setting out the parameters of
Perigid's liability and that it correctly found that specific direction was not a required element of aiding and abet-
ting.5 3 In particular, the Prosecution asserts that conduct is directed towards a crime if it facilitates or causes this
crime. In this context, the Prosecution contends that specific direction has no independent meaning and is part of
the substantial effect requirement.54 The Prosecution also suggests that specific direction has no independent mean-
ing even in cases where an aider and abettor is remote from actions of principal perpetrators.
22. The Prosecution submits that while specific direction "emanates" from the Tadi6 Appeal Judgement, the
latter did not provide a complete description of aiding and abetting liability.5 6 It maintains that even judgements
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referring to specific direction focus exclusively on substantial contribution in addressing the actus reus of aiding
and abetting.5 7 The Prosecution also maintains that caselaw in other jurisdictions does not require specific direction
in cases where an aider and abettor's conduct is remote from relevant crimes.
23. The Prosecution suggests that the proximity of an alleged aider and abettor to crimes committed by the
principal perpetrators is one factor that a trial chamber may consider in determining whether substantial contribution
is established. 5 9 However, in this regard, the Prosecution submits that the Delalid et al. Appeal Judgement held that
an aider and abettor's assistance may be removed in time and space from relevant crimes6 0 and asserts that a trial
chamber may take into account factors other than geographic proximity in determining substantial contribution,
including duration, frequency, and intensity of interactions with principal perpetrators or assistance to their crimes. 6 1
24. The Prosecution underscores the extensive nature of assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS in this case,
suggesting that the scale of this aid alone gives rise to aiding and abetting liability.6 2 In this regard, the Prosecution
asserts that Perigi6 knew of VRS crimes but nonetheless "voluntarily provided indispensable, massive, and con-
sistent personnel and logistical assistance" to the VRS, interacted regularly with "VRS perpetrators" of crimes,
"visited the war zone several times",6 3 and "continuously and actively lobbied the [FRY Supreme Defence Council
("SDC")] to ensure that the VRS's ability to wage war in [Bosnia] was sustained". 4 The Prosecution further asserts
that attacks against civilians, including those in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, were so central to the VRS's overall mil-
itary strategy that it "was not possible" for Perigi6 to direct military assistance only towards the VRS's legitimate
war efforts.6 5 Finally, the Prosecution contends that Perigid's personal motives with respect to VRS crimes are irrel-
evant to a determination of his criminal liability in this regard, as he knew that the assistance provided to the VRS
would probably facilitate the commission of crimes.66
2. Analysis
(a) Specific Direction as a Component of Aiding and Abetting Liability
25. Perigi6 contends that both the Trial Judgement and the Mrklid and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement erro-
neously held that specific direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. 7 Before turning to
Perigi's contention, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to review its prior aiding and abetting juris-
prudence.
26. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the first appeal judgement setting out the parameters of aiding and abetting
liability was the Tadie Appeal Judgement, rendered in 1999, which described the actus reus of criminal liability
for aiding and abetting as follows:
The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruc-
tion of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the
68crime.
27. In defining the elements of aiding and abetting liability, the Tadid Appeal Judgement contrasted aiding and
abetting with JCE, distinguishing these modes of liability on the basis of specific direction. The Appeals Chamber
underscored that, while the actus reus of JCE requires only "acts that in some way are directed to the furthering
of the common plan or purpose", the actus reus of aiding and abetting requires a closer link between the assistance
provided and particular criminal activities: assistance must be "specifically" - rather than "in some way" - directed
towards relevant crimes.6 9
28. To date, no judgement of the Appeals Chamber has found cogent reasons to depart from the definition of
aiding and abetting liability adopted in the Tadie Appeal Judgement. Moreover, many subsequent Tribunal and ICTR
appeal judgments explicitly referred to "specific direction" in enumerating the elements of aiding and abetting, often
repeating verbatim the Tadid Appeal Judgement's relevant holding.70
29. The Appeals Chamber notes that, while certain appeal judgements rendered after the Tadid Appeal Judge-
ment made no explicit reference to specific direction, several of these employed alternative but equivalent formu-
lations. In particular, the Simie Appeal Judgement defined the actus reus of aiding and abetting as "acts directed
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to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime".' Similarly, the Orie Appeal
Judgement, discussing aiding and abetting in the context of omission liability, explained that the "omission must
be directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a crime and have a substantial effect
upon the perpetration of the crime".72 The ICTR's Ntawukulilyayo and Rukundo Appeal Judgements referred to
acts that are "specifically aimed" towards relevant crimes.7 3 Finally, the ICTR's Karera Appeal Judgement stated
that the "actus reus of aiding and abetting is constituted by acts or omissions that assist, further, or lend moral support
to the perpetration of a specific crime".7 4 The Appeals Chamber considers that these judgements effectively included
specific direction as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
30. The Appeals Chamber further notes that although other Tribunal and ICTR appeal judgements neither refer
to specific direction nor provide an equivalent formulation, these judgements do not offer a comprehensive definition
of the elements of aiding and abetting liability. In particular, the Haradinaj et al., Limaj et al., Furundlija, Renzaho,
Nchamihigo, Zigiranyirazo, Ndindabahizi, Gacumbitsi, Semanza, and Rutaganda Appeal Judgements focused, as
relevant, only on particular elements of aiding and abetting liability or questions of fact, rather than providing an
exhaustive review of aiding and abetting as a whole. Similarly, the Gotovina and Markae, Krajiinik, Brdanin,
and Krsti6 Appeal Judgements did not explicitly set out all the elements of aiding and abetting liability. Insofar
as these appeal judgements referred to the elements of aiding and abetting liability, however, they cited to previous
appeal judgements that explicitly discussed specific direction. 7 6
31. By contrast to the judgements discussed above, the 2001 Delalid et al. Appeal Judgement endorsed a definition
of the actus reus of aiding and abetting that neither refers to specific direction nor contains equivalent language - the
only appeal judgement of the Tribunal or the ICTR to do so. 77 However, the Appeals Chamber explained in the 2007
Blagojevi6 and Jokid Appeal Judgement that "the Tadi6 [Appeal Judgement's] definition [of aiding and abetting
liability has] not been explicitly departed from". 78 The Appeals Chamber reasoned that in cases where specific
direction is not "included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting", findings on specific direction "will
often be implicit in the finding that the accused has provided practical assistance to the principal perpetrator which
had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime."7 Moreover, the Blagojevid and JokiW Appeal Judgement
expressly considered the Delalid et al. Appeal Judgement in both its analysis of cases that did not explicitly refer
to specific direction, and its conclusion that such cases included an implicit analysis of specific direction.so
32. Mindful of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber now turns to the 2009 Mrkgid and 9ljivaneanin Appeal
Judgement, and Perigid's contention that this judgement erroneously departed from settled jurisprudence by stating
that specific direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.8 1 In discussing the mens rea of
aiding and abetting, the Mrklid and 9ljivanjanin Appeal Judgement stated, in passing, that "the Appeals Chamber
has confirmed that 'specific direction' is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting." 82 This
statement may be read to suggest that specific direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.
However, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, is not persuaded that the Mrkgid and 9ljivaneanin Appeal
Judgement reflected an intention to depart from the settled precedent established by the Tadi6 Appeal Judgement.8 3
33. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber observes that the Mrkli6 and 9ljivaneanin Appeal Judgement's reference
to specific direction not being an "essential ingredient" is found in a section of the judgement analysing the mens
rea rather than actus reus of aiding and abetting. 8 4 In the context of rejecting 1jivanianin's assertion that aiding
and abetting by omission requires a heightened mens rea,8 5 the Appeals Chamber explained that $1jivanianin's
reference to specific direction as part of "the mens rea standard applicable to aiding and abetting" was erroneous
because specific direction "forms part of the actus reus not the mens rea of aiding and abetting."8 The Appeals
Chamber then stated that specific direction was "not an essential ingredient" of the actus reus of aiding and abet-
ting.8 The only authority cited to support this latter conclusion was the Blagojevi and Jokid Appeal Judgement's
holding that specific direction is a requisite element of aiding and abetting liability, albeit one that may at times
be satisfied by an implicit analysis of substantial contribution.
34. The Appeals Chamber recalls its settled practice to only "depart from a previous decision after the most
careful consideration has been given to it, both as to the law, including the authorities cited, and the facts." 8 9 The
Mrkli6 and 9ljivaneanin Appeal Judgement's passing reference to specific direction does not amount to such "care-
ful consideration". Had the Appeals Chamber found cogent reasons to depart from its relevant precedent, and
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intended to do so, it would have performed a clear, detailed analysis of the issue, discussing both past jurisprudence
and the authorities supporting an alternative approach.90 Instead, the relevant reference to specific direction: was
made in a section and paragraph dealing with mens rea rather than actus reus; was limited to a single sentence not
relevant to the Appeals Chamber's holding; did not explicitly acknowledge a departure from prior precedent; and,
most tellingly, cited to only one previous appeal judgement, which in fact confirmed that specific direction does
constitute an element of aiding and abetting liability.9 ' These indicia suggest that the formula "not an essential
ingredient" was an attempt to summarise, in passing, the Blagojevid and Jokid Appeal Judgement's holding that
specific direction can often be demonstrated implicitly through analysis of substantial contribution, rather than
abjure previous jurisprudence establishing that specific direction is an element of aiding and abetting liability.9 2
35. Appeal judgements rendered after the Mrklid and 9jivandanin Appeal Judgement confirm that the Appeals
Chamber in that case neither intended nor attempted a departure from settled precedent. 93 The 2012 Luki6 and Lukid
Appeal Judgement approvingly quoted the Blagojevid and Jokie Appeal Judgement's conclusion that a finding of
specific direction can be implicit in an analysis of substantial contribution. In the same paragraph, the Luki6 and
Lukid Appeal Judgement found that there were no cogent reasons to deviate from the holding of the Mrkid and
9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement with respect to specific direction.9 4 The Lukid and Luki6 Appeal Judgement thus
confirms that the Blagojevi6 and Jokie and MrkUi6 and ljivananin Appeal Judgements are not antithetical in their
approach to specific direction.9 5 In addition, the Appeals Chamber recalls that several ICTR appeal judgements
rendered after the Mrkgid and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement explicitly refer to specific direction or equivalent
language in enumerating the elements of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.9 6
36. Accordingly, despite the ambiguity of the Mrklid and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Cham-
ber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that specific direction remains an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting
liability. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, thus reaffirms that no conviction for aiding and abetting
may be entered if the element of specific direction is not established beyond reasonable doubt, either explicitly
or implicitly.97
(b) Circumstances in which Specific Direction Must be Explicitly Considered
37. At the outset, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, recalls that the element of specific direction estab-
lishes a culpable link between assistance provided by an accused individual and the crimes of principal perpetra-
tors.9 8 In many cases, evidence relating to other elements of aiding and abetting liability9 9 may be sufficient to
demonstrate specific direction and thus the requisite culpable link.
38. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber notes that previous appeal judgements have not conducted extensive
analyses of specific direction. The lack of such discussion may be explained by the fact that prior convictions for
aiding and abetting entered or affirmed by the Appeals Chamber involved relevant acts geographically or otherwise
proximate to, and thus not remote from, the crimes of principal perpetrators. 1oo Where such proximity is present,
specific direction may be demonstrated implicitly through discussion of other elements of aiding and abetting lia-
bility, such as substantial contribution. For example, an individual accused of aiding and abetting may have been
physically present during the preparation or commission of crimes committed by principal perpetrators and made
a concurrent substantial contribution.' 0 In such a case, the existence of specific direction, which demonstrates the
culpable link between the accused aider and abettor's assistance and the crimes of principal perpetrators, will be
self-evident.
39. However, not all cases of aiding and abetting will involve proximity of an accused individual's relevant acts
to crimes committed by principal perpetrators. Where an accused aider and abettor is remote from relevant crimes,
evidence proving other elements of aiding and abetting may not be sufficient to prove specific direction. In such
circumstances, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, holds that explicit consideration of specific direction
is required. 0 2
40. The factors indicating that acts of an accused aider and abettor are remote from the crimes of principal
perpetrators will depend on the individual circumstances of each case. However, some guidance on this issue is
provided by the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence. In particular, the Appeals Chamber has previously concluded,
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in discussing aiding and abetting liability, that significant temporal distance between the actions of an accused indi-
vidual and the crime he or she allegedly assisted decreases the likelihood of a connection between that crime and
the accused individual's actions.10 3 The same rationale applies, by analogy, to other factors separating the acts of
an individual accused of aiding and abetting from the crimes he or she is alleged to have facilitated. Such factors
may include, but are not limited to, geographic distance.
(c) The Trial Chamber's Analysis of Aiding and Abetting in this Case
41. In assessing PerigiCs culpability and defining the legal standard for aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber
relied on the Mrkgie and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement to find that specific direction was not an element of aiding
and abetting liability, and did not consider, either explicitly or implicitly, whether PerigiCs acts were specifically
directed towards the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. 104 However, as explained above, while the relevant
phrasing of the Mrkie and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement is misleading, that appeal judgement did not deviate
from prior well-settled precedent that specific direction is a necessary element of aiding and abetting liability.'0 5
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that the Trial Chamber's holding that specific
direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting was an error of law.
42. The Appeals Chamber observes that Perigi's assistance to the VRS was remote from the relevant crimes
of principal perpetrators. 1 0 6 In particular, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS was independent from the VJ,107
and that the two armies were based in separate geographic regions. 108 In addition, the Trial Chamber did not refer
to any evidence that Perigi6 was physically present when relevant criminal acts were planned or committed. 109 In
these circumstances, 10 the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, further considers that an explicit analysis of
specific direction would have been required in order to establish the necessary link between the aid Perigi6 provided
and the crimes committed by principal perpetrators.
43. The Appeals Chamber emphasises that the Trial Chamber's legal error was understandable given the par-
ticular phrasing of the Mrki6 and 9ljivandanin Appeal Judgement."' However, the Appeals Chamber's duty to
correct legal errors remains unchanged.' 12 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber will proceed to assess the evidence
relating to Perigi's convictions for aiding and abetting de novo under the correct legal standard, considering whether
PerigiCs actions were specifically directed to aid and abet the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.1 1 3
44. The Appeals Chamber notes that previous judgements have not provided extensive analysis of what evidence
may prove specific direction. However, the Appeals Chamber recalls again that the Tadid Appeal Judgement indi-
cated that specific direction involves finding a closer link between acts of an accused aider and abettor and crimes
committed by principal perpetrators than is necessary to support convictions under JCE.114 The types of evidence
required to establish such a link will depend on the facts of a given case. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber observes
that in most cases, the provision of general assistance which could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities
will not be sufficient, alone, to prove that this aid was specifically directed to crimes of principal perpetrators.' 15
In such circumstances, in order to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting, evidence establishing a direct link
between the aid provided by an accused individual and the relevant crimes committed by principal perpetrators is
necessary.
(d) The Extent to which Perigi6 Specifically Directed Assistance to VRS Crimes
45. In order to determine whether the assistance facilited by Perigid was specifically directed towards the VRS
Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, the Appeals Chamber will now review and assess de novo relevant evidence,
taking into account, where appropriate, the Trial Chamber's findings.
46. As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber did not find the VRS de jure
or defacto subordinated to the VJ.1 16 In particular, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS had a separate command
structure: the President of the Republika Srpska served as Commander-in-Chief of the VRS, with a Commander
of the VRS Main Staff assuming delegated authorities.1 17 Broader questions of VRS military strategy were
addressed by the Republika Srpska's Supreme Command, composed of the Republika Srpska's President, Vice
President, Speaker of the Assembly, and Ministers of Defence and Interior.' 18 While the Trial Chamber noted that
the VRS received support from the VJ, the Trial Chamber also identified sources of support other than the FRY."1 9
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In addition, the Trial Chamber found that Perigi was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have exercised effective
control over VJ troops seconded to the VRS.120 Finally, the Trial Chamber observed that Ratko Mladi6, the Com-
mander of the VRS Main Staff, refused to accept peace plans urged by the VJ and FRY leadership.121 The Appeals
Chamber, having considered this evidence in its totality, agrees with the Trial Chamber's determination that the
evidence on the record suggests that "the VRS and the VJ [were] separate and independent military entities".12 2
47. Having reaffirmed the Trial Chamber's conclusion that the VRS was independent of the VJ, the Appeals
Chamber will now consider whether VJ assistance to the VRS, which Perigid acknowledged having facilitated, was
specifically directed towards VRS crimes. 123 In particular, the Appeals Chamber will assess: (i) Peri§i's role in
shaping and implementing the FRY policy of supporting the VRS; (ii) whether the FRY policy of supporting the
VRS was specifically directed towards the commission of crimes by the VRS; and (iii) whether Perigi6 either imple-
mented the SDC policy of assisting the VRS in a way that specifically directed aid to the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo
and Srebrenica, or took action to provide such aid outside the context of SDC-approved assistance. The Appeals
Chamber considers that the relevant evidence in this case is circumstantial and thus can only support a finding of
specific direction if this is the sole reasonable interpretation of the record. 12 4
48. The Appeals Chamber underscores that the parameters of its inquiry are limited and focus solely on factors
related to Perigi's individual criminal liability for the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, not the potential
liability of States or other entities over which the Tribunal has no pertinent jurisdiction.12 5 The Appeals Chamber
also underscores that its analysis of specific direction will exclusively address actus reus. In this regard, the Appeals
Chamber acknowledges that specific direction may involve considerations that are closely related to questions of
mens rea. Indeed, as discussed below, evidence regarding an individual's state of mind may serve as circumstantial
evidence that assistance he or she facilitated was specifically directed towards charged crimes.12 6 However, the
Appeals Chamber recalls again that the mens rea required to support a conviction for aiding and abetting is knowl-
edge that assistance aids the commission of criminal acts, along with awareness of the essential elements of these
crimes.12 7 By contrast, as set out above, the long -standing jurisprudence of the Tribunal affirms that specific direc-
tion is an analytically distinct element of actus reus.12 8
(i) PerigiCs Role in Shaping and Implementing the SDC Policy of Supporting the VRS
49. The Appeals Chamber recalls that, as the Trial Chamber noted, Perigi6 served as Chief of the VJ General
Staff, and was thus the most senior officer of the VJ, from 26 August 1993 to 24 November 1998.129 In this capacity,
Perigi6 was responsible for ensuring combat readiness and organising VJ operations. 13 0 Perigi6 was subordinated
to the FRY President, whose "'enactments"' Perigi6 was obligated to implement.' 3' Ultimate authority over defence
policy and operational priorities for the VJ rested with the SDC.1 3 2 While SDC meetings were attended by many
individuals, including Perigi, final SDC decisions were taken by political leaders: the President of the FRY and
the Presidents of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.13 3
50. The decision to provide VJ assistance to the VRS was adopted by the SDC before Perigid was appointed
Chief of the VJ General Staff,' 3 4 and the SDC continued to support this policy during Perigid's tenure in this posi-
tion.13 5 Perigi6 regularly attended and actively participated in meetings of the SDC,13 6 and the SDC granted him
the legal authority to administer assistance to the VRS.' 37 However, the SDC retained and exercised the power to
review both particular requests for assistance and the general policy of providing aid to the VRS.1 3 8
51. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the SDC's responsibility for adopting the policy of assisting the VRS
does not, in itself, exempt Perigid from individual criminal liability. ' The Appeals Chamber considers that, in view
of the circumstances of this case, Perigi6 could still be found to have provided assistance specifically directed towards
the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica if: the policy he implemented involved providing assistance specifically
linked to VRS crimes; he implemented a policy meant to aid the general VRS war effort in a manner that specifically
directed assistance towards the VRS crimes; or, acting outside the scope of the SDC's official policy, he provided
assistance specifically directed towards VRS crimes.140 To assess whether evidence on the record supports any such
conclusions, the Appeals Chamber will first consider Trial Chamber findings and evidence regarding the parameters
of the SDC policy of providing assistance to the VRS, and will then evaluate evidence regarding Perigid's individual
actions.
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(ii) The SDC Policy of Providing Support to the VRS
52. The Appeals Chamber considers that two inquiries are relevant to assessing whether SDC assistance to the
VRS was specifically directed to facilitate the latter's criminal activities. The first inquiry assesses whether the VRS
was an organisation whose sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes. Such a finding would suggest
that assistance by the VJ to the VRS was specifically directed towards VRS crimes, including the VRS Crimes in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The second inquiry assesses whether the SDC endorsed a policy of assisting VRS crimes;
such a finding would again suggest that the assistance from the VJ to the VRS was specifically directed towards,
inter alia, the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
53. With respect to the first inquiry, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber did not characterise
the VRS as a criminal organisation; indeed, it stated that "Perigi6 is not charged with helping the VRS wage war
per se, which is not a crime under the Statute."14 1 Having reviewed the evidence on the record, the Appeals Chamber
agrees with the Trial Chamber that the VRS was not an organisation whose actions were criminal per se; instead,
it was an army fighting a war.14 2 The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber's finding that the VRS's strategy
was "inextricably linked to" crimes against civilians.14 3 However, the Trial Chamber did not find that all VRS activ-
ities in Sarajevo or Srebrenica were criminal in nature. The Trial Chamber limited its findings to characterising as
criminal only certain actions of the VRS in the context of the operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica."'4 In these
circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considers that a policy of providing assistance to the VRS's general war effort
does not, in itself, demonstrate that assistance facilitated by Perigi6 was specifically directed to aid the VRS Crimes
in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
54. Turning to the second inquiry, the Appeals Chamber first observes that the Trial Chamber discussed evidence
indicating SDC approval of measures to secure financing for the VJ's assistance to the VRS14 5 and to increase the
effectiveness of this assistance by systematising the secondment of VJ personnel and the transfer of equipment and
supplies.14 6 The Trial Chamber determined that this evidence "conclusively demonstrate[s] that the SDC licensed
military assistance to the VRS".14 7 However, the Trial Chamber did not identify any evidence that the SDC policy
directed aid towards VRS criminal activities in particular.14 8
55. The Appeals Chamber's de novo review of the evidentiary record also reveals no basis for concluding that
it was SDC policy to specifically direct aid towards VRS crimes.14 9 Instead, the SDC focused on monitoring and
modulating aid to the general VRS war effort. 5 0 For example, SDC discussions addressed difficulties in providing
particular levels of assistance requested by the VRS;15 ' salaries of VJ personnel seconded to the VRS;15 2 and
instances where members of the VJ provided supplies to the VRS without official approval. 5 3
56. The Appeals Chamber notes the Prosecution's suggestion that the magnitude of VJ aid provided to the VRS
is sufficient to prove Perigi's actus reus with respect to the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.15 4 However,
the Appeals Chamber observes that while the Trial Chamber considered evidence regarding volume of assistance
in making findings on substantial contribution, 5 5 this analysis does not necessarily demonstrate specific direction,
and thus such evidence does not automatically establish a sufficient link between aid provided by an accused aider
and abettor and the commission of crimes by principal perpetrators.15 6 In the circumstances of this case, indicia
demonstrating the magnitude of VJ aid to the VRS serve as circumstantial evidence of specific direction; however,
a finding of specific direction must be the sole reasonable inference after a review of the evidentiary record as a
whole. 157
57. The Appeals Chamber underscores that the VRS was participating in lawful combat activities and was not
a purely criminal organisation.15 8 In addition, as explained above, other evidence on the record does not suggest
that SDC policy provided that aid be specifically directed towards VRS crimes. 15 9 In this context, the Appeals Cham-
ber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that a reasonable interpretation of the evidence on the record is that the SDC
directed large-scale military assistance to the general VRS war effort, not to the commission of VRS crimes. Accord-
ingly, specific direction of VJ aid towards VRS crimes is not the sole reasonable inference that can be drawn from
the totality of the evidence on the record, even considering the magnitude of the VJ's assistance.
58. In view of the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, concludes that the SDC policy of
assisting the VRS was not proved to involve specific direction of VJ aid towards VRS crimes, as opposed to the
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general VRS war effort. In these circumstances, insofar as Perigi6 faithfully executed the SDC policy of supporting
the VRS, the aid Perigi6 facilitated was not proved to be specifically directed towards the VRS's criminal activities.
(iii) Perigid's Implementation of SDC Policy and Other Actions
59. The Appeals Chamber now turns to consider whether Perigi implemented the SDC policy of assisting the
VRS war effort in a manner that redirected aid towards VRS crimes, or took actions separate from implementing
SDC policy to the same effect. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber will consider PerigiCs role in SDC deliberations,
the nature of the assistance Perigi provided to the VRS, and the manner in which this aid was distributed. All of
these indicia can serve as circumstantial evidence of whether the aid he facilitated was specifically directed towards
VRS crimes. Finally, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether Perigi6 took actions, independent of his efforts
to implement the SDC policy, which would indicate that aid he facilitated was specifically directed towards the VRS
Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
60. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found that Perigi6 supported continuing the SDC policy
of assisting the VRS. 16 0 During meetings of the SDC, Perigid argued both for sustaining aid to the VRS and for
adopting related legal and financial measures that facilitated such aid.16 1 However, the Trial Chamber did not iden-
tify evidence demonstrating that Perigi6 urged the provision of VJ assistance to the VRS in furtherance of specific
criminal activities. Rather, the Trial Chamber's analysis of PerigiCs role in the SDC deliberations indicates that
Perigid only supported the continuation of assistance to the general VRS war effort. 16 2 Having reviewed the relevant
evidence, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, also finds no proof that Perigid supported the provision of
assistance specifically directed towards the VRS's criminal activities.' 63 Instead, evidence on the record suggests
that Perigid's relevant actions were intended to aid the VRS's overall war effort. For example, Perigi6 explained
to the SDC the overall costs of providing assistance to the VRS;64 advised the SDC of broad-based VRS requests
for assistance; 6 5 and criticised general "mistakes" of the Republika Srpska leadership that resulted in international
criticism of the broader VRS war effort.' 
6 6
61. The Appeals Chamber observes that Perigi6 had considerable discretion in providing assistance to the VRS,
including the power to deny requests for aid not submitted through official channels.16 7 While it is possible that
Perigi6 could have used this power to direct SDC-approved aid specifically towards VRS criminal activities, the
Trial Chamber did not make any findings to that effect,16 8 and the Appeals Chamber's review of relevant evidence
also suggests that Perigi directed assistance towards the general VRS war effort within the parameters set by the
SDC.16 9 In particular, as discussed below, neither the nature of the aid which Perigi6 oversaw nor the manner in
which it was distributed suggests that the assistance he facilitated was specifically directed towards the VRS Crimes
in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
62. The Appeals Chamber recalls that indicia demonstrating the nature and distribution of VJ aid could also
serve as circumstantial evidence of specific direction. The Appeals Chamber notes in this regard that the Trial Cham-
ber classified the assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS in two broad categories: first, secondment of personnel,17 0
and, second, provision of military equipment, logistical support, and military training.17 '
63. With respect to the secondment of VJ soldiers to the VRS, the Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Cham-
ber found that Perigi6 persuaded the SDC to create the 30th PC, a unit of the VJ that served as the administrative
home of VJ soldiers and officers seconded to the VRS and which was used to increase and institutionalise the support
already provided to seconded VJ soldiers and officers.17 2 The Trial Chamber also found that the establishment of
the 30th PC constituted practical assistance to the VRS, as the 30th PC helped sustain soldiers already seconded
to the VRS and facilitated the secondment of additional personnel.' 7 3 However, the record contains no evidence
suggesting that the benefits provided to seconded soldiers and officers - including VJ-level salaries, housing, and
educational and medical benefits' 7 4 - were tailored to facilitate the commission of crimes. Rather, evidence on the
record indicates that such benefits were structured to mirror those offered by the VJ and thus provide seconded
soldiers and officers with the same level of support as they received prior to secondment.17 5 In addition, the evidence
on the record does not suggest that VJ soldiers and officers were seconded in order to specifically assist VRS criminal
acts.' 7 6 In the Appeals Chamber's view, the fact that VJ soldiers seconded to the VRS may have been involved
in criminal acts after secondment17 7 does not, alone, prove that their secondments were specifically directed to
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supporting these criminal acts.178 In sum, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, finds that neither the Trial
Chamber's analysisl 7 9 nor the Appeals Chamber's de novo review of evidence on the record 80 provides a basis
for concluding that PerigiCs facilitation of secondments was directed to assist VRS crimes rather than the general
VRS war effort.
64. With respect to the second category of assistance provided by the VJ to the VRS, the Appeals Chamber
recalls the Trial Chamber's finding that the VJ supplied the VRS with "comprehensive" logistical aid,18 1 often not
requiring payment for this assistance.18 2 In particular, the Trial Chamber concluded that the VJ provided the VRS
with military equipment and supplies on a large scale, including semi-automatic rifles, machine guns, pieces for
machine-gun barrels, cannons, bullets, grenades, rocket launchers, mortar ammunition, mines, rockets, anti-aircraft
ammunition, and mortar shells.18 3 The Trial Chamber further concluded that the VJ offered military training to VRS
troops1 8 4 and assisted with military communications.' 8 5 The Appeals Chamber's review of evidence on the record
also demonstrates that, pursuant to the overall policy of the FRY, as expressed in decisions of the SDC, Perigi6
administered and facilitated the provision of large- scale military assistance to the VRS.186
65. The Appeals Chamber considers that the types of aid provided by the VJ to the VRS do not appear incom-
patible with lawful military operations.' 87 In addition, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found
that bullets and shells recovered from crime sites in Sarajevo and Srebrenica were not proved beyond reasonable
doubt to have originated from the VJ,t 88 and further notes that the Prosecution does not challenge this finding on
appeal.' 8 9 In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, recalling that evidence proving sub-
stantial contribution does not necessarily demonstrate specific direction,190 finds that evidence regarding the nature
of assistance provided by the VJ does not establish that this assistance was specifically directed towards VRS crimes.
66. The manner in which Perigid distributed VJ aid to the VRS also does not demonstrate specific direction.1 9'
The Trial Chamber determined that part of this assistance was sent to certain VRS units involved in committing
crimes.19 2 However, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that neither the Trial Chamber's anal-
ysis' 9 3 nor the Appeals Chamber's de novo review identified evidence that aid was provided to the VRS in a manner
directed at supporting its criminal activities. Evidence on the record instead suggests that Perigid considered the
VRS's requests as a whole and that VJ assistance was delivered to multiple areas within BiH to aid the general
VRS war effort.19 4
67. The Appeals Chamber also finds that evidence on the record does not prove that Perigi6 took steps to assist
VRS crimes outside his role of implementing the SDC's general aid policy. Indeed, Perigid refused requests for
assistance submitted outside of official channels195 and urged the SDC to punish VJ personnel who provided such
unauthorised assistance.' 9 6 While Perigi6 appears to have ordered VJ units to support certain VRS combat oper-
ations, neither the Trial Chamber's analysis' 9 7 nor the Appeals Chamber's review of relevant evidence establish
that this assistance was directed at supporting criminal activities of the VRS.198 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber
notes that the Prosecution was unable to identify evidence on the record suggesting that Perigid specifically directed
assistance towards the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.199
68. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber considered extensive evidence suggesting that
Perigi knew of crimes being committed by the VRS, especially with respect to Sarajevo. 2 0 0 However, the Appeals
Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, recalls that evidence regarding knowledge of crimes, alone, does not establish spe-
cific direction, which is a distinct element of actus reus, separate from mens rea.2 0 1 Indicia demonstrating that Perigid
knew of the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica may serve as circumstantial evidence of specific direction;
however, a finding of specific direction must be the sole reasonable inference after a review of the evidentiary record
as a whole.2 02
69. The Appeals Chamber recalls again that the VRS undertook, inter alia, lawful combat activities and was
not a purely criminal organisation. 2 0 3 In this context, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, considers that
a reasonable interpretation of relevant circumstantial evidence is that, while Perigi may have known of VRS crimes,
the VJ aid he facilitated was directed towards the VRS's general war effort rather than VRS crimes. Accordingly,
the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, holds that Perigi6 was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
facilitated assistance specifically directed towards the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
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(e) Conclusions from De Novo Review of Evidence on the Record
70. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, has clarified that, in view of the remoteness of Perigi6's actions
from the crimes of the VRS, an explicit analysis of specific direction was required. 2 04 As detailed above, the Appeals
Chamber's review of the Trial Chamber's general evidentiary findings and de novo assessment of evidence on the
record do not demonstrate that SDC policy provided for directing VJ aid towards VRS crimes. Similarly, the Trial
Chamber's conclusions and evidence on the record do not suggest that Perigi's implementation of SDC policy
specifically directed aid towards VRS crimes, or that Perigi6 took other actions to that effect.
71. The Appeals Chamber has already noted that the Trial Chamber identified evidence of the large scale of
VJ assistance to the VRS, as well as evidence that Perigi6 knew of VRS crimes. 2 0 5 However, having considered
these Trial Chamber findings alongside its de novo analysis of the record, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dis-
senting, is not convinced that the only reasonable interpretation of the totality of this circumstantial evidence is that
Perigid specifically directed aid towards VRS crimes. Instead, a reasonable interpretation of the record is that VJ
aid facilitated by Perigi6 was directed towards the VRS's general war effort rather than VRS crimes. Accordingly,
the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, is not convinced that the VJ aid which Perigi6 facilitated was proved
to be specifically directed towards the VRS Crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
72. As demonstrated above, the Appeals Chamber considers that assistance from one army to another army's
war efforts is insufficient, in itself, to trigger individual criminal liability for individual aid providers absent proof
that the relevant assistance was specifically directed towards criminal activities.20 6 The Appeals Chamber under-
scores, however, that this conclusion should in no way be interpreted as enabling military leaders to deflect criminal
liability by subcontracting the commission of criminal acts. If an ostensibly independent military group is proved
to be under the control of officers in another military group, the latter can still be held responsible for crimes com-
mitted by their puppet forces.20 7 Similarly, aid from one military force specifically directed towards crimes com-
mitted by another force can also trigger aiding and abetting liability. However, as explained above, a sufficient link
between the acts of an individual accused of aiding and abetting a crime and the crime he or she is charged with
assisting must be established for the accused individual to incur criminal liability. Neither the findings of the Trial
Chamber nor the evidence on the record in this case prove such a link with respect to Perigid's actions.
B. Conclusion
73. The Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, recalls that specific direction is an element of the actus reus
of aiding and abetting liability, and that in cases like this one, where an accused individual's assistance is remote
from the actions of principal perpetrators, specific direction must be explicitly established.20 8 After carefully review-
ing the evidence on the record, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, concludes that it has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt that Periii carried out "acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support
to the perpetration of [the] certain specific crime[s] " committed by the VRS. 2 0 9 Accordingly, Perigid's convictions
for aiding and abetting must be reversed on the ground that not all the elements of aiding and abetting liability have
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
74. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, grants Perigi's Second and Third
Grounds of Appeal in part, insofar as they relate to his convictions for aiding and abetting, and reverses his con-
victions under Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Indictment. In view of this finding, Perigid's remaining
arguments in his First through Twelfth Grounds of Appeal are dismissed as moot.
IV. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY (GROUND 13)
75. The Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, convicted Perigid under Article 7(3) of the Statute for failing
to punish VJ soldiers who were responsible for crimes perpetrated during the shelling of Zagreb on 2 and 3 May
1995 ("Zagreb Perpetrators"), namely murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs of war
(Counts 6 and 8); and murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity (Counts 5 and 7) (collectively, "Zagreb
Crimes").2 10
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76. Perigid submits, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber erred in law and fact in determining that he was in a
superior-subordinate relationship with the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time the Zagreb Crimes took place.2 1 1 Accord-
ingly, Perigid requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse his convictions as a superior under Article 7(3) of the
Statute.212
A. Background
77. The Trial Chamber's finding of superior responsibility was based in part on PerigiCs position as a senior
officer of the VJ. 2 13 More specifically, the Trial Chamber found that some members of the VJ, including the Zagreb
Perpetrators, were seconded to assist war efforts of the Republic of Serbian Krajina ("RSK"). These seconded VJ
members served in the Serbian Army of the Krajina ("SVK"). 214 VJ soldiers were seconded to the SVK through
administrative assignment to a unit of the VJ named the 40th PC,2 1 5 which provided their salaries, housing, and
educational and medical benefits during secondment.2 1 6
78. The Trial Chamber found that soldiers seconded through the 40th PC "held all the key commanding positions
in the SVK." 2 17 For example, Milan eleketi6, an officer seconded through the 40th PC, served as Chief of the
SVK Main Staff from 22 February 1994 until mid-May 1995.218 His replacement, Mile Mrkgi, was also a VJ
member seconded to the SVK. 2 1 9 The Trial Chamber concluded that the SVK operated pursuant to parallel chains
of command, one led by Milan Marti6 as President of the RSK and Supreme Commander of the SVK, and the other
by Perigid, the most senior officer of the VJ, and other members of the FRY leadership. 220 The Trial Chamber found
that both chains of command could issue binding orders to seconded VJ members, including the Zagreb Perpe-
trators.22 1
79. The Trial Chamber concluded that the fall of the RSK in August 1995 curtailed the scope of SVK oper-
ations.2 22 The Trial Chamber also noted witness testimony that SVK forces, including VJ soldiers seconded through
the 40th PC, effectively operated as members of the VJ after August 1995.223
B. Submissions
80. Perigi6 asserts that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that he: (i) was the de jure superior of the Zagreb
Perpetrators;224 and (ii) had effective control over VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC as demonstrated by
his ability to discipline and issue binding orders to its members.2 2 5 With respect to dejure authority, Perigi6 asserts
that the law of the VJ defined a "superior" as a person who "commands a military unit or military institution, or
individuals serving in a military unit or military institution".2 2 6 In this regard, Perigi6 submits that VJ soldiers sec-
onded through the 40th PC were part of a chain of command separate from his own authority and that any authority
he possessed over the 40th PC was solely administrative and too circumscribed to make him a de jure superior.2 27
81. Perigi6 further contends, inter alia, that evidence on the record does not prove that he possessed the material
ability to discipline the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the shelling of Zagreb in early May 1995.228 He submits
that the Trial Chamber's findings to the contrary failed to adequately account for: (i) evidence of divergences
between the goals of the VJ and the SVK that would have impeded his ability to discipline VJ soldiers seconded
through the 40th PC;2 2 9 (ii) the fall of the RSK in the months following the shelling of Zagreb, which then enabled
Periii to discipline soldiers and officers seconded through the 40th PC;230 and (iii) the Prosecution's decision not
to pursue charges of "failure to prevent", by which, Perigi6 contends, the Prosecution effectively conceded PerigiC's
lack of effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators. 2 3 1 More broadly, Perigi submits that the Trial Chamber failed
to assess a key indicator of superior responsibility: whether he and the Zagreb Perpetrators acted as though they
were in a superior-subordinate relationship. 2 3 2 Perigi6 further submits that the Trial Chamber did not sufficiently
consider the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rade Rageta, who stated that Perigi6 did not possess disciplinary
power over soldiers and officers seconded to the SVK through the 40th PC.2 3 3 Perigi also contends that the Trial
Chamber erred by failing to understand that his power to "verif[y] " promotions of VJ soldiers seconded through
the 40th PC did not give him the ability to control these soldiers' actions.2 34
82. Perigi6 submits that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Martid and Perigi each controlled VJ soldiers
seconded to the SVK through separate chains of command. He submits that even if such a "bifurcated" command
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structure existed, it would nonetheless have negated effective control by one chain of command, given the high risk
of conflicting orders from the two command chains. 2 3 5 In any case, Perigi6 maintains that the Trial Chamber erred
in concluding that he possessed the power to issue orders to VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC and serving
in the SVK during the shelling of Zagreb.2 3 6 In this regard, he underscores the "paucity of orders" he "allegedly
issued" to VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC 2 3 7 and the fact that these orders were not always executed. 2 3 8
Perigi6 further underscores 'eleketiC's refusal to cease shelling Zagreb despite Perigid's explicit request to that
effect. 2 3 9 Finally, Perigid maintains that the Trial Chamber: (i) erred by identifying as non-administrative ("com-
mand") orders documents emanating from outside his chain of command or constituting requests, administrative
orders, or attempts to influence; 2 4 0 (ii) did not sufficiently consider relevant testimony from, inter alia, Witness
Rageta and Prosecution Witness Rade Orli6 to the effect that Perigi did not issue command orders to the SVK;2 4 1
and (iii) erroneously inferred from orders he issued after the shelling of Zagreb that he had been able to issue com-
mand orders during the shelling. 2 4 2
83. The Prosecution responds, inter alia, that it did not concede Perii's lack of effective control over VJ sol-
diers seconded through the 40th PC when it decided not to pursue "failure to prevent" charges against him. 2 4 3 The
Prosecution maintains that the Trial Chamber reasonably concluded that Perigi6 exercised effective control over the
Zagreb Perpetrators.2 4 4 The Prosecution also asserts that Perigi6 "confuses 'effective control' with 'ability to control
the acts of the perpetrators"'. It submits that in determining whether an individual possessed effective control, the
relevant inquiry is whether he or she had the ability to prevent or punish acts of subordinates.2 45
84. More specifically, the Prosecution contends that Perigi6 fails to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred
in concluding that Perigid was the de jure superior of the Zagreb Perpetrators.2 4 6 The Prosecution submits that the
Trial Chamber reasonably relied upon Perigid's initiation of disciplinary proceedings against key officers of the 40th
PC as an especially relevant indicator of effective control.2 47 The Prosecution adds that Perigid fails to cite any
evidence of "new command and control relationships" after the fall of the RSK,24 8 and it rejects Perigid's claims
that the VJ's goals diverged from those of the SVK during the shelling of Zagreb.24 9 Moreover, the Prosecution
maintains that the Trial Chamber acted within the scope of its discretion in preferring evidence of Perigid's "actual
exercise of disciplinary powers" over "ostensible structures and overt declarations of the belligerents". 2 5 0 The
Prosecution also asserts that the Trial Chamber acted reasonably in considering that "Perigi's ability 'to make
independent recommendations with respect to the verification of promotions' militate[d] 'in favour of effective
control.'" 2
5 1
85. The Prosecution further contends that the Trial Chamber reasonably considered evidence on the record in
concluding that the VJ and SVK operated pursuant to parallel chains of command and that Perigi6 could nonetheless
exercise effective control.2 52 In particular, the Prosecution maintains that command orders issued by Perigid indi-
cated his effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators.2 5 3 The Prosecution submits that the Trial Chamber rea-
sonably discounted testimony by Witnesses Rageta and Orlid about Perigi's inability to issue command orders.2 54
Finally, the Prosecution suggests that Perigi6 did not issue many command orders because of his seniority and the
concurrence of VJ and SVK goals, 2 5 5 and denies that the limited evidence of compliance with Perigi's orders under-
mined the Trial Chamber's relevant conclusions. 2 5 6
C. Analysis
86. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a conviction pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute requires:
i. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
ii. the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed;
and
iii. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish
the perpetrator thereof.257
87. The Appeals Chamber recalls that a superior cannot be held criminally liable under Article 7(3) of the Statute
unless he or she exercised effective control over his or her subordinates.2 5 8 Indicators of effective control are "more
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a matter of evidence than of substantive law, and those indicators are limited to showing that the accused had the
power to prevent [or] punish".259 The Appeals Chamber further recalls that an accused may not be held liable under
Article 7(3) of the Statute for failure to punish crimes that were committed by a subordinate before the accused
assumed command over the subordinate.2 60
88. As a threshold matter, the Appeals Chamber first addresses PerigiCs assertion that, by not pursuing charges
for his failure to prevent the Zagreb Crimes, the Prosecution conceded that he lacked effective control over the
Zagreb Perpetrators. 2 6 1 The Appeals Chamber recalls that the duty to prevent is distinct from the duty to punish,
involving different conduct committed at different times.2 62 In addition, the ability to prevent a crime is not nec-
essarily a prerequisite to proving effective control.2 6 3 In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber is not persuaded
that the Prosecution conceded that PeriWi lacked effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators.
89. The Appeals Chamber also notes Perigid's submission that the Trial Chamber did not sufficiently consider
relevant testimony by Witnesses Rageta and Orli6.2 64 Before turning to the specifics of Perigid's relationship with
the Zagreb Perpetrators, the Appeals Chamber will consider whether the Trial Chamber committed an error in this
regard.
1. The Testimony of Witnesses Rageta and Orli6
90. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber's conclusions on effective control were premised on
its finding that at relevant times, Perigi6 had the ability to discipline or issue binding command orders to the SVK,
but that in the context of a "bifurcated" command structure, wherein the SVK also answered to Marti6, PeriWii
generally chose not to exercise these powers.2 65 The Trial Chamber relied on its finding in this regard to explain
both the absence of any evidence that Perigi took disciplinary actions against VJ soldiers seconded to the SVK
prior to the shelling of Zagreb,2 6 6 and the limited evidence of binding command orders issued by Perigi to VJ
soldiers seconded through the 40th PC during the same period.26 7 In finding that Perigi6 exercised effective control
over seconded VJ soldiers, the Trial Chamber also noted evidence that, after the fall of the RSK, Perigi6 initiated
disciplinary proceedings against VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC 2 68 and identified evidence suggesting
that Periid could influence promotions and terminations of seconded VJ soldiers.26 9 In addition, the Trial Chamber
considered Perigid's involvement in paying salaries to seconded officers and soldiers, the general support provided
by the VJ to the SVK, and reports on SVK activities sent to the VJ. 2 7 0
91. In reviewing evidence regarding effective control, the Trial Chamber summarised the relevant testimony
of Witness Rageta, a VJ officer who testified that he did not participate in the VJ chain of command after he was
seconded to the SVK, 2 7 1 and that prior to the shelling of Zagreb, Perigid did not possess immediate disciplinary
powers over VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC.2 7 2 The Trial Chamber also summarised the relevant evidence
of Witness Orlid, a VJ officer seconded to the SVK, who testified that he did not receive any command orders from
the VJ while serving in the SVK.2 73 The testimony of these two witnesses suggested that Perigid did not have the
authority to issue command orders or discipline members of the VJ seconded to the SVK, and thus that he did not
exercise effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time the Zagreb Crimes were committed.2 74 However,
while the Trial Chamber noted this testimony from Witnesses Rageta and Orli when summarising relevant evidence,
it concluded that Perigi exercised effective control over VJ soldiers and officers seconded through the 40th PC
without discounting or addressing the testimony of either of these two witnesses. 2 7 5
92. The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that a trial chamber is entitled to rely on the evidence it finds most
276 als Chamber, nevertheless, recalls that:convincing. The AppeasCabrneetesrclsth:
a [t]rial [c]hamber need not refer to the testimony of every witness or every piece of evidence on
the trial record, 'as long as there is no indication that the [t]rial [c]hamber completely disregarded
any particular piece of evidence.' Such disregard is shown 'when evidence which is clearly relevant
[...] is not addressed by the [t]rial [c]hamber's reasoning.' 2 7 7
The Appeals Chamber also recalls that "not every inconsistency which the [t]rial [c]hamber failed to discuss renders
its opinion defective"; 2 7 8 what constitutes a reasoned opinion depends on the specific facts of a case. 2 7 9 However,
in certain circumstances, insufficient analysis of evidence on the record can amount to a failure to provide a reasoned
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opinion. Such a failure constitutes an error of law requiring de novo review of evidence by the Appeals
Chamber.2 8 1
93. Turning to the particulars of this appeal, the Appeals Chamber recalls that in the months prior to the shelling
of Zagreb, Witnesses Rageta and Orlid occupied senior positions within the SVK: Witness Rageta served as Chief
of the SVK Main Staff Security Department, while Witness Orlid served as Chief of the SVK Intelligence Depart-
ment.2 8 2 The Trial Chamber cited Witness Rageta's testimony that he was in daily contact with the VJ General Staff
and that this contact included reports on individuals seconded from the VJ. 2 83 The Trial Chamber also noted Witness
Orlid's testimony that the SVK Intelligence Department, which he headed, coordinated closely with its counterparts
in the VJ. 2 8 4 Because of their official roles, each witness interacted with both the VJ and the SVK chains of command
and was in position to experience first-hand the relationship between the VJ and SVK; Witness Rageta, in particular,
filed reports about VJ personnel seconded to the SVK.28 5 These two witnesses would thus have an informed per-
spective as to whether VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC participated in the VJ's chain of command, as
well as Perigi's relevant disciplinary powers. In this context, their testimony was clearly relevant to the Trial Cham-
ber's analysis of effective control.
94. The Trial Chamber did not make any explicit findings as to potential deficiencies in the testimony of Wit-
nesses Rageta or Orlid.28 6 To the contrary, the Trial Chamber explicitly discussed Witness Rageta's testimony in
at least 11 paragraphs of the Trial Judgement with respect to other issueS287 and cited to Witness Rageta's testimony
in at least 17 additional paragraphs, not directly related to Perigid's effective control over seconded VJ soldiers.28 8
Several of these references rely on Witness Rageta's testimony without corroboration. 2 8 9 The Trial Chamber also
explicitly discussed testimony by Witness Orli in at least two paragraphs of the Trial Judgement 290 and cited to
Witness Orlid's testimony in at least eight additional paragraphs, not directly related to Perigid's effective control
over seconded VJ soldiers.29 1 This extensive reliance, without corroboration in some cases,29 2 suggests that the Trial
Chamber considered these witnesses' testimony to be credible.
95. The Appeals Chamber considers that the analysis undertaken by the Trial Chamber with respect to Perigid's
effective control might be regarded as "reasoned" in itself. However, in the Appeals Chamber's view, an analysis
limited to a select segment of the relevant evidentiary record is not necessarily sufficient to constitute a reasoned
opinion. In the context of this case, the Trial Chamber's failure to explicitly discuss and analyse the evidence of
Witnesses Rageta and Orli6 constituted a failure to provide a reasoned opinion. The Appeals Chamber acknowledges
that a trial chamber's failure to explicitly refer to specific witness testimony will often not amount to an error of
law, especially where there is significant contrary evidence on the record.2 93 However, the Appeals Chamber under-
scores that, as explained above, the testimony of Witnesses Rageta and Orlid was clearly relevant, relied upon in
other sections of the Trial Judgement, and not explicitly discounted in whole or in part.294 The Appeals Chamber
also notes that the Trial Chamber acknowledged the comparatively limited evidence on the record regarding Perigid's
ability to issue orders to or discipline VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC. 2 9 5 In these circumstances - i.e.
given the paucity of relevant evidence, and the credible testimony contrary to the Trial Chamber's conclusions -
296the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that, merely by noting its existence, the Trial Chamber adequately addressed
the testimony of Witnesses Rageta and Orli. 2 97
96. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber's failure to address the relevant por-
tions of this testimony in its analysis of Perigi's superior responsibility constituted a failure to provide a reasoned
opinion, an error of law. 2 9 8 In view of the Trial Chamber's legal error, the Appeals Chamber will proceed to assess
the evidence relevant to Perigi's exercise of effective control de novo. As detailed below, the evidence relating
to Perigi's effective control is circumstantial and thus can only support a finding of effective control if this is the
sole reasonable interpretation of the record.2 99
2. Perigi's Ability to Exercise Effective Control over the 40th PC
97. In order to determine whether Periii exercised effective control over VJ officers and soldiers seconded
through the 40th PC at the time of the Zagreb Crimes, the Appeals Chamber will review and assess de novo relevant
evidence on the record, taking into account, as appropriate, the Trial Chamber's findings. 30 In particular, the
Appeals Chamber will consider: (i) Perigid's instruction that Zagreb not be shelled; (ii) whether Perigi6 could issue
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command orders to soldiers seconded through the 40th PC; (iii) whether Perigi6 could exercise disciplinary authority
over VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC; and (iv) other indicia of Perigi's ability to control VJ soldiers
seconded through the 40th PC, including his influence over promotions and terminations.0o
(a) PerigiCs Instruction that Zagreb not be Shelled
98. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the Trial Chamber found that SVK forces under teleketid's command
began to shell Croatian targets on 1 May 1995, and that this shelling encompassed the Zagreb area on 2 May 1995.302
The shelling of Zagreb continued until 3 May 1995, resulting in deaths and injuries of civilians. 30 3 According to
the Trial Chamber, teleketid ordered that this shelling take place on the basis of instructions from Martid, the RSK
President.3 04
99. The Trial Chamber also found that during the SVK attacks in Croatia, Perigi6 instructed teleketi6 not to
shell Zagreb.os However, these instructions were not obeyed, and Perigi6 explained to Milogevi6 that teleketid
had continued shelling Zagreb pursuant to Martid's orders and in complete disregard of Perigi's own instructions
to the contrary.3 06 Though Perigi told Milogevid that he forced teleketi6 to stop the shelling,3 07 the attack on Zagreb
continued for two days, after Perigi's initial instructions on 1 May 1995.308
100. The Appeals Chamber notes that intercepted conversations between Perigi6 and Milogevid suggest neither
was convinced that Perigi6 was able to exercise effective control over teleketid. In one such intercept, when asked
why he could not instruct teleketi6 to ignore Martid's orders, Perigi6 explained that teleketi6 was obedient to
Marti. 30 9 In the Appeals Chamber's view, this intercept suggests that Perigi6 did not believe teleketi6 to be under
his effective control, and that Milogevid considered Perigid able to influence but not command teleketi6.
101. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the crimes Perigi6 was found responsible for failing to punish occurred
during the shelling of Zagreb in early May 1995.310 Any indicia of Perigi6's effective control over the SVK at that
specific time are thus particularly significant.3 1 1 The Appeals Chamber observes that during this period, the evidence
described above demonstrates that, when Marti6 and Perigid endorsed directly conflicting courses of action,
teleketi6 chose to obey orders from Marti6 and ignore Perigi6's explicit instructions.3 12 In addition, the phone inter-
cepts identified by the Trial Chamber suggest that neither Perigi6 nor Milosevid perceived teleketi6 as effectively
controlled by Periii. 3 13 On its face, PerigiCs inability to control significant actions by teleketi6, an important
VJ officer seconded through the 40th PC during the shelling of Zagreb, and apparent acknowledgement that he
lacked such power, is inconsistent with exercise of effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators.
(b) Evidence Regarding Perigi6's Ability to Issue Command Orders to Soldiers Seconded Through the 40th PC
102. As set forth above, two witnesses whom the Trial Chamber considered credible,3 14 and who served as senior
SVK officers, testified that Perigi6 did not issue command orders to them while they were serving in the SVK.
Witness Rageta stated that he was no longer part of the VJ's chain of command after being assigned to the 40th
PC, while Witness Orlki testified that he received no command orders from Perigi after his secondment.3 15
103. In addition, the Trial Chamber noted evidence of Prosecution Witness MP-80, who testified that Perigid
did not issue command orders to teleketi63 16 and further noted that VJ communications to the SVK prior to the
shelling of Zagreb, which raised issues such as weapons handling and material for meetings, used terms associated
with encouragement rather than coercion, such as "please". 1 The Trial Chamber also referred to reports by Perigid
that Dugan Loniar, a VJ officer seconded through the 40th PC and Commander of the SVK 11th Corps, "accepted"
approaches Perigi had advocated.3 18 The Appeals Chamber considers that the use of non-coercive terms suggests
that Perigi6 did not exercise effective control over VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC.
104. The Appeals Chamber notes that Perigi6 transmitted an order from Milogevid to, inter alia, the SVK on
7 December 1994, several months prior to the shelling of Zagreb ("7 December Order"), ordering the SVK to facil-
itate the passage of United Nations aid.3 19 However, the text of the 7 December Order does not demonstrate that
it constituted an order by Perigid to individuals falling within the VJ chain of command. First, the 7 December Order
320 321
was addressed to both teleketid,3 20 who was a seconded VJ officer, and RSK President Martid, who was not.
Given that the RSK President was not formally linked to the VJ,3 2 2 the Appeals Chamber considers that Martid's
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inclusion in the 7 December Order suggests that the order was not an instruction issued to soldiers falling within
the VJ's chain of command. Second, the 7 December Order invokes Milogevid's personal authority as President
of Serbia and makes no apparent reference to the VJ's chain of command other than using Perigid as a conduit to
pass on the order.32 3 Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes that Ieleketid responded to the 7 December Order by
addressing Milogevid directly, 324 thereby bypassing Perigi and the VJ chain of command entirely. In these cir-
cumstances, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the 7 December Order establishes PerigiCs ability to issue
command orders to VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC.
105. The Appeals Chamber also notes that Perigid issued an order on 24 March 1995, prior to the shelling of
Zagreb, establishing a group of coordinating staff to aid activities of the 40th PC ("24 March Order").32 5 Perigid
ordered that this coordinating staff be composed of a mixed group that included VJ members, VJ members seconded
to the SVK, a retired VJ officer, and a member of the RSK's Ministry of Defence. 32 6 The Appeals Chamber observes
that certain individuals to whom the order referred, including the retired officer and the member of the RSK's Min-
istry of Defence, were not subject to Perigi6's authority.32 7 In addition, the Trial Chamber noted the absence of any
evidence that the 24 March Order was actually obeyed.328 In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber does not
consider that the 24 March Order is capable of supporting the inference that Perigi6 could issue command orders
to soldiers seconded through the 40th PC.
106. Finally, the Appeals Chamber notes evidence on the record indicating that after the shelling of Zagreb,
and after ieleketid was replaced by Mrklid in mid-May 1995, Perigid issued instructions to soldiers and officers
seconded through the 40th PC.3 2 9 Nevertheless, evidence on the record suggests that Perigi6 had a better relationship
with Mrkgi6 than with ieleketi6, and that Mrklid's compliance with PerigiCs instructions marked a departure from
the chain of command obeyed by teleketid.33 0 The personal relationship between Perigi6 and Mrkgid could plausibly
account for PerigiCs increased influence over the SVK after teleketi6 ceased serving as SVK commander. In any
event, however, this evidence does not in any way demonstrate that Perigi6 exercised effective control over the
Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the shelling of Zagreb.
107. In sum, the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that Perigi6 could issue command orders to soldiers seconded
through the 40th PC at the time of the shelling of Zagreb. While some evidence does suggest the existence of such
power,33 this interpretation of the record is not the only reasonable one, especially given credible direct evidence
from Witnesses Rageta and Orlid that VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC were not within Perigid's chain
of command.332
(c) Evidence Regarding PerigiCs Ability to Discipline VJ Members Seconded to the SVK
108. The Appeals Chamber recalls that Witness Rageta, a senior SVK officer, testified that Perigi6 did not possess
immediate disciplinary powers over soldiers seconded through the 40th PC while they served in the SVK. 3 The
Appeals Chamber considers that Witness Rageta's testimony is supported by the Trial Chamber's acknowledgement
that evidence on the record did not demonstrate that Perigi initiated any disciplinary proceedings against soldiers
seconded through the 40th PC before, during, or immediately after the Zagreb Crimes.3 34
109. The Trial Chamber considered evidence suggesting that in the months after the fall of the RSK in August
1995,"" Perigii was involved in disciplinary proceedings against individuals seconded through the 40th PC, and
that these proceedings involved actions taken during service with the SVK.33 One reasonable interpretation of this
evidence is that Perigi6 always possessed dormant disciplinary powers but only exercised them after the fall of the
RSK.33 However, the Appeals Chamber notes evidence that SVK forces came under direct VJ control after the
fall of the RSK.3 In the Appeals Chamber's view, an equally reasonable interpretation is that Perigi acquired
disciplinary powers over VJ members seconded to the SVK after the Zagreb Crimes were committed.
110. The Appeals Chamber notes the possibility that Periii could have punished the Zagreb Perpetrators after
they rejoined the VJ chain of command following the fall of the RSK. The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that
an accused may not be held liable under Article 7(3) of the Statute for failure to punish crimes committed by a
subordinate before the accused assumed command over the subordinate. 3 3 9 Thus, the fact that, after the shelling
of Zagreb, Perigi may eventually have acquired the power to punish the Zagreb Perpetrators does not expose him
to liability for failure to punish the Zagreb Crimes.
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111. In these circumstances the Appeals Chamber does not consider that evidence of Perigid's involvement in
disciplinary activities proves that he exercised effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the Zagreb
Crimes.
(d) Other Evidence
112. The Appeals Chamber notes the existence of evidence that Perigi6 had some control over promotions and
terminations of service for VJ soldiers serving in the SVK.34 0 In particular, Perigid had an extensive role in the
"verification" of promotions granted by the SVK to VJ personnel seconded through the 40th PC. 3 4 1 In addition,
even though Perigid's power to terminate the careers of VJ soldiers seconded through the 40th PC was circumscribed
by law, he possessed a "certain amount of discretion" over this process.34 2 The Appeals Chamber is thus satisfied
that Periid exercised influence over the professional development of VJ soldiers and officers seconded to the SVK.
The Appeals Chamber also notes that the Trial Chamber reviewed evidence indicating that Perigi6 was heavily
involved in SVK operations through his influence over VJ aid.3 43
113. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that evidence relating to PerigiC's power over the careers of VJ members
seconded to the SVK, as well as evidence regarding Perigid's involvement in broader SVK operations, demonstrates
his influence over VJ soldiers serving in the SVK at the time of the Zagreb Crimes. The Appeals Chamber will
consider this evidence in conjunction with the totality of evidence on the record to determine whether effective
control is proved.
(e) The Totality of the Evidence
114. Having assessed different types of evidence relevant to PerigiCs effective control, the Appeals Chamber
will now consider whether this evidence, assessed in its totality, proves that Perigid possessed effective control over
the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the Zagreb Crimes. The Appeals Chamber again notes the circumstantial nature
of the relevant evidence; 34 in these circumstances, a finding of effective control is possible only if that is the sole
reasonable inference from this evidence.3 45
115. Some evidence is consistent with PeriWi possessing effective control over soldiers seconded through the
40th PC, including the Zagreb Perpetrators, at the time of the Zagreb Crimes. At the time Zagreb was shelled, PeriWii
could influence promotions and terminations of seconded VJ soldiers, and, more broadly, the operations of the
SVK.3 46 In addition, there is evidence that Perigid was able to issue orders to soldiers seconded through the 40th
PC after the Zagreb Crimes.34 7 Finally, following the fall of the RSK, PeriWi was involved in disciplinary pro-
ceedings related to actions by VJ soldiers seconded to the SVK. 3 4 8
116. Other evidence on the record, however, suggests that during the shelling of Zagreb, Perigid did not possess
effective control over VJ soldiers serving in the SVK. Most importantly, the Appeals Chamber notes that 'eleketid,
a VJ officer seconded through the 40th PC, ignored Perigid's instruction not to shell Zagreb and instead complied
with the contrary orders of RSK President Marti6. 3 4 9 Considered in isolation, this failure to obey Perigi6's instruction
might be dismissed as an exceptional instance of disobedience or rebellion. Yet no evidence proves beyond rea-
sonable doubt that Perigid ever issued a command order to a VJ soldier serving in the SVK prior to the shelling
of Zagreb. Similarly, there is no conclusive evidence that Perigi6 ever disciplined a VJ soldier seconded through
the 40th PC prior to the fall of the RSK.3 50
117. In this context, the Appeals Chamber considers that a reasonable alternative interpretation of the record
is that Perigii could influence, but did not possess effective control over, the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of the
shelling of Zagreb. Months after the Zagreb Crimes, Perigid may have acquired effective control over VJ soldiers
seconded to the SVK. However, this is of no consequence for purposes of command responsibility under Article
7(3) of the Statute. An accused superior may not be held liable for failure to punish crimes committed by subordinates
before he or she assumed command over them.3 5 1
118. Accordingly, a finding that Periid exercised effective control over the Zagreb Perpetrators at the time of
the Zagreb Crimes is not the sole reasonable inference from the totality of the circumstantial evidence in this case.
Thus, PerigiCs effective control has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
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3. Conclusion
119. Absent a finding of effective control over subordinates, superior responsibility cannot be established.35 2
Thus, the Appeals Chamber reverses the Trial Chamber's finding that Perigid was liable for failing to punish the
Zagreb Perpetrators for their actions during the shelling of Zagreb. Perigid's remaining submissions regarding supe-
rior responsibility are therefore moot and need not be addressed.
120. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber erred in convicting Perigid
for failing to punish the Zagreb Perpetrators. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber grants Perigid's Thirteenth Ground
of Appeal and reverses his convictions under Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Indictment.
V. SENTENCING (GROUNDS 14-17)
121. The Trial Chamber, Judge Moloto dissenting, sentenced Perigi6 to 27 years of imprisonment.3 5 3 Perii6
appeals against his sentence 3 5 4 The Appeals Chamber recalls, however, that it has reversed all of Perigi6 's con-
victions.35 5 Accordingly, PerigiCs contentions in his Fourteenth through Seventeenth Grounds of Appeal are dis-
missed as moot
VI. DISPOSITION
122. For the foregoing reasons, THE APPEALS CHAMBER,
PURSUANT TO Article 25 of the Statute and Rules 117 and 118 of the Rules;
NOTING the respective written submissions of the parties and the arguments they presented at the hearing of 30
October 2012;
SITTING in open session;
GRANTS, Judge Liu dissenting, Mom6ilo PerigiCs Second and Third Grounds of Appeal, in part;
REVERSES, Judge Liu dissenting, Mom6ilo Perigid's convictions for murder, inhumane acts, and persecutions
as crimes against humanity, and for murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs of
war; and ENTERS, Judge Liu dissenting, a verdict of acquittal under Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of
the
Indictment;
GRANTS Mom6ilo PerigiCs Thirteenth Ground of Appeal; REVERSES Mom6ilo PerigiC's convictions for
murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, and for murder and attacks on civilians as violations
of the laws or customs of war; and ENTERS a verdict of acquittal under Counts 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Indictment;
DISMISSES, Judge Liu dissenting, as moot Mom6ilo Perigi' s remaining grounds of appeal; and
ORDERS, in accordance with Rules 99(A) and 107 of the Rules, the immediate release of Mom6ilo Perigi6, and
DIRECTS the Registrar to make the necessary arrangements.
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
Judge Theodor Meron, Presiding Judge Carmel Agius
Judge Liu Daqun Judge Arlette Ramaroson Judge Andr6sia Vaz
Judges Theodor Meron and Carmel Agius append a joint separate opinion.
Judge Liu Daqun appends a partially dissenting opinion.
Judge Arlette Ramaroson appends a separate opinion.
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Dated this 28th day of February 2013,
At The Hague, The Netherlands.
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VII. JOINT SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES THEODOR MERON AND CARMEL AGIUS
1. While we agree with the analysis and conclusions of the Appeal Judgement, we write separately to address
the issue of whether specific direction should be considered as part of the actus reus or mens rea of aiding and
abetting.
2. Starting with the 1999 Tadi6 Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber has always approached specific direc-
tion as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.' We observe, however, that whether an individual com-
mits acts directed at assisting the commission of a crime relates in certain ways to that individual's state of mind.
In this regard, we note that, as set out in the Appeal Judgement, proof of specific direction will often be found in
evidence that may also be illustrative of mens rea.2 Thus, for example, Perigid's comments to the SDC, which
directly relate to his mental state, are considered in the Appeal Judgement as circumstantial evidence relevant to
whether his subsequent acts were specifically directed towards VRS crimes.
3. We also note that the mens rea standard of aiding and abetting - knowledge that aid provided assists in the
commission of the relevant crime and awareness of the essential elements of the crime4 - would not preclude con-
sideration of issues relevant to specific direction. Indeed, in our view, whether an individual specifically aimed to
assist relevant crimes logically fits within our current mens rea requirement.
4. Accordingly, were we setting out the elements of aiding and abetting outside the context of the Tribunal's
past jurisprudence, we would consider categorising specific direction as an element of mens rea. However, we are
satisfied that specific direction can also, as the Appeal Judgement's analysis demonstrates, be reasonably assessed
in the context of actus reus.5 The critical issue raised by the requirement of specific direction, regardless of whether
it is considered in the context of actus reus or mens rea, is whether the link between assistance of an accused indi-
vidual and actions of principal perpetrators is sufficient to justify holding the accused aider and abettor criminally
responsible for relevant crimes. In these circumstances, we do not believe that cogent reasons justify departure from
the Tribunal's precedent of considering specific direction in the context of actus reus.6 Such departures from estab-
lished precedent should, in our view, generally be limited to untenable situations, such as a holding which is logically
impossible or is demonstrated to be contrary to customary international law.
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
Judge Theodor Meron Judge Carmel Agius
Dated this 28th day of February 2013,
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.
[Seal of the Tribunal]
ENDNOTES
1 See Appeal Judgement, paras 25-36. 5 See Appeal Judgement, paras 45-74.
2 See Appeal Judgement, para. 48. 6 See Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 109. See also
3 See Appeal Judgement, paras 59-60. Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, paras 107-108, 110-111.
4 See Lukid and Lukid Appeal Judgement, para. 428.
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VIII. PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LIU
1. In this Judgement, the Majority reverses PerigiCs convictions for aiding and abetting murder, inhumane acts,
and persecution as crimes against humanity; and murder and attacks on civilians as violations of the laws or customs
of war.' This reversal is predicated on the finding that the Trial Chamber erred in holding that specific direction
is not a required element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability.2 The Majority then conducts a de novo
review of the evidence and concludes that it was insufficient to prove that the aid Perigi6 provided was specifically
directed towards the criminal activities of the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.3 I respectfully disagree with the
Majority's reasoning and its conclusion in this regard.
2. While I recognise that the specific direction requirement has been mentioned in the relevant jurisprudence,
I note that it has not been applied consistently. Indeed, the cases cited by the Majority as evidence of an established
specific direction requirement merely make mention of "acts directed at specific crimes"4 as an element of the actus
reus of aiding and abetting liability. In the majority of these cases the Appeals Chamber simply restates language
from the Tadid Appeal Judgement without expressly applying the specific direction requirement to the facts of the
case before it.5 Moreover, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal demonstrates that aiding and abetting liability may be
established without requiring that the acts of the accused were specifically directed to a crime.6 In these circum-
stances, I am not persuaded that specific direction is an essential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting
liability7 - or that it is necessary to explicitly consider specific direction in cases where the aider and abettor is remote
from the relevant crimes.8
3. Given that specific direction has not been applied in past cases with any rigor, to insist on such a requirement
now effectively raises the threshold for aiding and abetting liability.9 This shift risks undermining the very purpose
of aiding and abetting liability by allowing those responsible for knowingly facilitating the most grievous crimes
to evade responsibility for their acts. The present appeal is a case in point.
4. The Trial Chamber held Perigi6 responsible for facilitating the criminal acts of the VRS in Sarajevo and Sre-
brenica. Although the Trial Chamber did not characterise the VRS as a wholly criminal organisation,1o it nonetheless
found that the crimes committed by the VRS were "inextricably linked to the war strategy and objectives of the
VRS leadership."" It further found that the VRS "wag[ed] a war that encompassed systematic criminal actions
against Bosnian Muslim civilians as a military strategy and objective." 1 2 In this regard, the Trial Chamber found
that the siege of Sarajevo was instrumental to the implementation of a VRS objective and that the "systematic and
widespread sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo by the VRS over a period of three years demonstrate[d]
that the VRS's leading officers relied on criminal acts to further the siege." 13 With regard to Srebrenica, the Trial
Chamber found that the VRS pursued a strategic objective "aimed at establishing a corridor in the Drina River valley
and eliminating the Drina River as a border between the Serbian states."1 4 It concluded that "this goal was imple-
mented through the plan of 'plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into a humanitarian crisis and ultimately
eliminating the enclave'."'5
5. As the highest ranking officer of the VJ, Perigi oversaw a system which provided considerable practical
assistance to the VRS.16 In his capacity as Chief of the VJ General Staff, Perigid institutionalised the provision of
logistical assistance to the VRS1 7 and had the power to approve or deny aid requests from the VRS.18 The Trial
Chamber noted that Perigi6 refused aid requests that did not comply with his procurement procedure and that his
decisions in this regard were final. 19 Moreover, the Trial Chamber considered that "Perigi's role went beyond
administering the logistical assistance process" and noted that Perigid "recurrently encouraged the SDC to maintain
this assistance, thereby helping craft the FRY's policy to aid these armies."20
6. The Trial Chamber found that Perigii presided over "a system providing comprehensive military assistance
to the VRS". 2 1 It noted that this assistance included "considerable quantities of weaponry comprising a very large
part of the VRS's munition requirements"22 and the transfer of a number of VJ officers and key personnel to the
VRS.23 The Trial Chamber carefully assessed the magnitude of the logistical aid Perigid directed towards the VRS
and found that "[w]ithout the regular supply of considerable quantities of ammunition and other weaponry, as well
as fuel, technical expertise, repair services and personnel training, the VRS would have been hampered in conducting
its operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica." 2 4 Significantly, the Trial Chamber established that "important logistical
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and technical support was provided to the units involved in perpetrating the charged crimes" in Sarajevo and Sre-
brenica.2 5
7. This comprehensive assistance was crucial to the VRS's continued existence.2 6 The Trial Chamber found
that the assistance provided by Perigi6 "sustained the very life line of the VRS and created the conditions for it to
implement a war strategy that encompassed the commission of crimes against civilians."2 7 Without this aid, the
Trial Chamber concluded, the VRS could not have operated effectively as an army.28 It consequently found that
"Peri§id's logistical assistance and personnel assistance, individually and cumulatively, had a substantial effect on
the crimes perpetrated by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica". 29
8. The Trial Chamber also reviewed extensive evidence in finding that Perigi6 was aware of the VRS's pro-
pensity to commit criminal acts. It found that, from the early stages of the war, "Perigi6 was provided with infor-
mation, from a variety of sources, of the VRS's criminal behaviour and discriminatory intent. This information
related to acts of violence against Bosnian Muslims perpetrated in the BiH theatre of war and made Perigi6 aware
of the VRS's propensity to commit crimes." 3 0 The Trial Chamber concluded that Perigi6 knew "of the VRS criminal
intent in the implementation of its war strategy" and nonetheless provided assistance to the VRS war effort in
the Sarajevo campaign.3 1 It further found that Perigi6 "knew that individual crimes committed by the VRS
before the attack on Srebrenica would probably be followed by more crimes committed by the VRS after the take-
over of the enclave in July 1995" and that "Perigi6 had contemporaneous knowledge of allegations that the VRS
was committing crimes in Srebrenica." 3 2
9. Having carefully reviewed Perigid's submissions on appeal,3 3 I am satisfied that the Trial Chamber did not
err in its assessment of the evidence on the record or in its analysis of aiding and abetting liability. PerigiCs acts,
which facilitated the large-scale crimes of the VRS through the provision of considerable and comprehensive aid,
constitute a prime example of conduct to which aiding and abetting liability should attach. Moreover, even assuming
specific direction were a required element of aiding and abetting liability, I am not convinced that an acquittal would
be justified given the magnitude, critical importance, and continued nature of the assistance Perigi provided to the
VRS.
10. In these circumstances, I would have upheld Peri§ii's convictions for aiding and abetting the crimes com-
mitted by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.
Judge Liu Daqun
Dated this 28h day of February 2013
At The Hague,
The Netherlands.
[Seal of the Tribunal]
ENDNOTES
1 Appeal Judgement, paras 73-74, 122. 3 Appeal Judgement, paras 45-72.
2 Appeal Judgement, paras 25-36. See also Appeal Judgement, 4 As noted in the Appeal Judgement, this formulation varies
paras 37-74. slightly from case to case. For a list of cases using this or a
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IX. OPINION StPAREE DU JUGE RAMAROSON SUR LA QUESTION DE LA
VIStE SPA CIFIQUE DANS LA COMPLICITE PAR AIDE ET ENCOURAGEMENT
A. Introduction
1. La Chambre d'appel acquitte ce jour Perigi6 et infirme sa condamnation notamment au titre de la complicit6
par aide et encouragement pour les crimes d'assassinat, actes inhumains et pers6cutions comme crimes contre
1'humanit6 de m8me que pour les crimes d'assassinat et d'attaques contre des civils comme violation des lois et
coutumes de la guerrel. Je souscris A la conclusion d6gag6e dans l'arr&. Toutefois, je ne partage pas le point de
vue exprim6 par la majorit6 selon lequel la visie spdcifique2 constitue un 616ment essentiel de la complicit6 par aide
et encouragement et devant 8tre exclusivement analys6 dans le cadre de l'actus reus.
B. La visle spicfique n'est pas un critare explicite de la complicite par aide et encouragement
2. Le pr6sent arr8t soutient que la visle spicifique constitue une composante requise de la complicit6 par aide
et encouragement, ce qui, A mon humble avis, est une conclusion erron6e se basant sur le postulat selon lequel l'arr8t
Tadi6 considbre la visde spicifique comme 6tant un 616ment de la complicit6 par aide et encouragement3 . En effet,
la Chambre d'appel prend comme point de d6part l'affaire Tadid, laquelle a d6fini la complicit6 par aide et encour-
agement en opposition avec l'entreprise criminelle commune4 . Le fait que cette d6finition inclut les termes << qui
visent sp6cifiquement A > indiquerait selon la majorit6 que la visde spdcifique constitue une composante de la com-
plicit6 par aide et encouragements. Or, cette d6finition est de nature purement contextuelle car elle 6tait destin6e
A 6tablir une comparaison entre la complicit6 par aide et encouragement et l'entreprise criminelle commune, sans
6tablir une description complbte de la responsabilit6 p6nale du complice6 .
3. La Chambre d'appel affirme ensuite que la jurisprudence posterieure ne s'est jamais 6cart6e de la d6finition
fournie dans l'arr8t TadiO, 1'amenant ainsi a conclure que la visie spdcifique est une condition requise de 1'actus
reus pour 6tablir la complicit6 par aide et encouragement, conclusion A laquelle je ne puis souscrire8 . En effet, la
visge spdcifique n'a jamais ete isolee en tant que telle, tant d'un point de vue 16gal que factuel.
4. D'un point de vue 16gal, les arr&s post6rieurs n'ont fait que reprendre, pour la grande majorit6 de fagon ver-
batim9, la d6finition 6nonc6e dans l'affaire Tadid, certains d'entre eux ayant utilis6 des synonymeslo. Je note par
ailleurs que la Chambre d'appel, en evoquant la visle spdcifique sous une forme substantiv6e, d6note en ce sens
qu'elle 6rige un nouveau critbre. D'un point de vue factuel, je constate que la jurisprudence n'a jamais caract6ris6
ce critbre en l'appliquant express6ment aux faits de l'espice 1 .La plupart des affaires n'en font pas mention tandis
que certaines l'incluent de fagon implicite A travers 1'effet substantiell2
5. J'en conclus que la Chambre de premire instance n'a pas commis d'erreur de droit13 en indiquant que: <<l'616ment
mat6riel de l'aide et l'encouragement n'exige pas que 1'aide apport6e par le complice "vise express6ment A faciliter les
crimes "> 14. Elle fonde A juste titre cette conclusion sur le paragraphe 159 de l'arr8t Mrklid et fljivandanin et les para-
graphes 182, 185 A 189 de l'arrt BlagojeviW et Joki 5 . L'arr8t Mrki6 et 9ljivandanin indique qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un
<< ingr6dient essentiel > tandis que l'arr8t Blagojevid et Jokie affirme que ce critere peut tre pris en compte.de fagon
implicite dans une analyse fond6e sur l'effet substantiel. A mon avis, ces deux affirmations ne se contredisent pas. L'arr&t
Lukid et Lukid rendu le 4 d6cembre 2012 a 6galement statu6 de la sorte, tout en indiquant que l'arr& Mrklid et 9ljivaneanin
<< a clarifid "que la vis6e sp6cifique n'est pas un ingr6dient essentiel de l'actus reus de la complicit6 par aide et encour-
agement" 16 Or, le pr6sent arr~t juge que 1'arret Mrki6 et 9ljivandanin a employ6 une formulation pouvant induire en
erreur17.E s'agit 1A d'une nette contradiction avec lajurisprudence anterieure18 .La conclusion de la Chambre de premibre
instance me parait A ce titre fond6e en droit.
6. En cons6quence, je ne partage pas la conclusion l6gale d6gag6e par la majorit6 en vertu de laquelle la visge
spdcifique, A d6faut d'8tre implicite dans l'effet substantiel, a 6t6 l'immuable position jurisprudentielle et doit con-
stituer une condition requise de l'actus reus pour 6tablir la complicit6 par aide et encouragement 9 . Au regard de
l'6tat des lieux de la jurisprudence, cette affirmation cat6gorique 2 0 de la Chambre d'appel me semble constituer
un revirement de jurisprudence. Il s'agit 6galement de la premibre fois que la visle spdcifique est appliqu6e de faqon
21explicite aux faits de 1'espe
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C. Les implications de la visle spocifigue
7. Je considbre que l'id6e d'une visle spdcifique est implicitement prise en compte dans le cadre de la mens rea.
Orienter un acte, le viser est A mon sens subjectif et implique n6cessairement une analyse de la mens rea du complice.
Cependant, la jurisprudence a trait6 la question de la visie spdcifique A travers l'actus reuS22. En effet, elle a consid6r6
que la visle spdcifique pouvait ftre implicite A travers 1'effet substantiel23, lequel fait partie de l'actus reus. Toutefois,
comme la frontibre avec la mens rea me parait t6nue 24, je ne puis souscrire A l'affirmation selon laquelle la visle spdcifique
est un 616ment requis de l'actus reus, s6par6 de la mens rea25 . Je note par ailleurs que la fagon dont la Chambre d'appel
applique ce critbre comprend des 616ments relatifs au lien de causalit626, lien qui n'est pourtant pas requis en tant que
tel par notre jurisprudence2 7 . A mon sens, le lien de causalit6 est pris en compte A travers I'effet substantiel 28.
8. La Chambre d'appel pr6cise les circonstances d'application de la visle spdcifique et affimne la n6cessit6 de la con-
sid6rer de fagon explicite lorsque l'accus6 est loin de la schne de crime29 , pour 6tablir un lien entre les actes de l'accus6
et les actions des auteurs principaux 30 . Or, la jurisprudence indique que les actes de complicit6 peuvent etre commis en
un endroit 6loign6 du lieu de sa commission sans pour autant exiger la visle spdcifique3 1. En cons6quence, la Chambre
d'appel introduit A mon sens une distinction nouvelle dans le droit de l'aide et I'encouragement en affirmant que dans
les cas oil l'accus6 se trouve loin de la schne de crime, la visie spdcifique doit etre analys6e de fagon explicite. En vertu
du principe ubi lex non distinguit, je ne peux souscrire au raisonnement de la Chambre d'appel sur ce point.
9. Prenant acte de l'absence de d6veloppements factuels relatifs A la visie spdcifique dans la jurisprudence ant6-
rieure, la Chambre d'appel justifie ce point au motif que l'accus6 se trouvait A proximit6 de la schne de crime 3 2.
Cela d6montre A mon sens que le cceur du probl6me n'est point la question d'une visle spdcifique, conditionn6e
A l'dloignement ou non de l'accus6, mais celle de sa mens rea. En effet, lorsque l'accus6 se trouve a proximit6 de
la schne de crime, la mens rea peut se d6duire ais6ment des actes mmes de l'accus6. Or, il est plus difficile de
l'6tablir quand l'accus6 est 6loign6 de la scene de crime, plus sp6cifiquement s'agissant du deuxibme volet de la
mens rea qui est la conscience que l'aide fournie assiste les crimes commis .
D. La mens rea de Peri§ii
10. La Chambre d'appel indique qu'elle n'a pas trouv6 de preuve d6montrant que Perigi6 soutenait la fourniture
d'une aide sp6cifiquement dirig6e vers les activit6s criminelles de la VRS et qu'au contraire, de par ses actes, Perigi6
voulait soutenir 3 4 l'effort de guerre g6n6ral de la VRS3 5 . Cela suggbre A mon sens que la Chambre d'appel a con-
sid6r6 que Periii n'avait pas la mens rea requise, a savoir qu'il n'avait pas conscience que ses actes assistaient
la commission des crimes comnmis Sarajevo et Srebrenica 3 6 . A mon humble avis, si les actes de Perigi ne visaient
pas spdcifiquement a, cela signifie qu'il n'avait pas conscience que, par ses actes, il assistait A la commission des
crimes commis A Sarajevo et Srebrenica. Pour cette raison, je me rallie A la majorit6 et souscris A l'acquittement de
Periii car je considbre que la Chambre d'appel a inclus de faqon implicite dans son analyse de la visde spdcifique, celle
de la mens rea de Perigi. Cependant, je l'aurais exprimbe dans le cadre d'une analyse explicite relative A la mens rea
car l'acquittement de Periic prononce sur la base d'un critbre qui ne constitue pas un pr6c6dent 6tabli dans notre juris-
prudence, ne me parait pas fond6 en droit.
Fait en frangais et en anglais, la version frangaise faisant foi.
Juge Arlette Ramaroson
Le 28 f6vrier 2013
La Haye (Pays-Bas)
(Sceau du Tribunal]
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fait d'aider ou d'encourager la perp6tration d'un crime. ( ... )
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perp6tration d'un crime sp6cifique (meurtre, extermination,
viol, torture, destruction arbitraire de biens civils, etc.), et ce
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revanche, dans le cas d'actes commis en vertu d'un objectif
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que les termes << qui visent spdcifiquement & >> servent A
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ou d'une autre > employds pour l'entreprise criminelle
commune. Or, la visle d'une certaine maniare n'est pas
devenue un critbre de l'entreprise criminelle commune. Sur
la nature contextuelle de cette d6finition, voir les Arr8ts
Blagojevi6 et Jokid, par. 185 et Aleksovski, par. 163.
5 Arr8t, par. 25-36.
6 Arrat Aleksovski, par. 163.
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de l'entreprise criminelle commune survient aprbs un long
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et A son caractbre coutumier (voir les par. 185 & 228). Ce
d6veloppement est compris A cet 6gard dans une sous-section
intitul6e : << L'article 7.1) du Statut et la notion de but
commun >>. La complicit6 par aide et encouragement ne
constitue donc pas le coeur du raisonnement.
8 Arr~t, par. 36.
9 Arrit, note de bas de page 70.
10 Arr8t, par. 29 se rdfdrant aux Arr8ts SimW, par. 85 et Orie,
par. 43.
11 Voir par exemple les affaires Simid, Blakie, Lukie et Lakid,
Ori, Mrki5 et glijvandanin, Kvoka et al., Krnojelac,
Furundiija, Kordi6 et c'erkez, Delalid et al., Gotovina et
Marka, Krajiinik Brdanin, Krstid, Seromba, Nahimana
et al., Kalimanzira, Rukundo, Muvunyi, Muhimana,
Ntakirutimana et Ntakitutimana, Nchamihigo, Zigiranyirazo.
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la seule affaire qui tendrait A appr6cier cet 616ment serait
l'affaire Kupresiki (voir Arrat Kupregki6 et al., par. 283 :
<< Cependant, la simple pr6sence de l'accus6 devant l'h6tel
Vitez ne saurait 8tre assimilde A un acte visant
pr6cis6ment A aider, encourager ou soutenir moralement
les auteurs de pers6cutions. >)
12 Voir par exemple l'Arr&t Ntagerurera et a., par. 375. Je note
A cet dgard la phrase suivante :«< La Chambre d'appel
consid~re que les constatations de la Chambre de premi~re
instance ne permettent pas d'dtablir que l'omission
d'Imanishimwe visait sp~cifiquement & offrir & ses soldats la
possibilit6 d'aller perp~trer le massacre, ni qo'il avait
connaissance de l'assistance qo'il leur apportait. >> Voir
6galement les Arr~ts Ntawukulilyayo, par. 215-216;
Vasijevi6, par. 134-135; Blagojevi6 et Jokic, par. 194-199;
Karera, par. 322; Renzaho, par. 337.
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14 Jogement, par. 126.
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instance, en se rfrant galement 'Arret Blagojevisi et
Jokim, a donc bien not6 que la visie spcifique pouvait
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pas exig46 de fagon explicite.
16 Arrlt Luki6 et LukiA, par. 424 (traduction non officielle).
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18 A titre additionnel, je note que 2Arr5L Gotovina et Marka,
leqoel est on arrt r6cent, ne mentionne aucunement a vise
spJcifque alors qu'i indique les v6ments pertinents (u as
relevant >) de la complicite par aide et encouragement, i
savoir 1'effet sobstantiel et la mens rea requise (cf par. 127
«<The Appeals Chamber first recalls, as relevant, that for an
individoal to be held liable for aiding and abetting, he must
have substantially contributed to a crime and must have
known that the acts he performed assisted the principal
perpetrator's crime [notes de bas de page omises]). De
mme, 'Arrt Brdanin montre dans le cadre de son analyse
que leffet substantiel et la mens rea sont les deux ments 
considrer dans le cadre de la complicit par aide et
encouragement (cf. par. 496). De meme, l'Arr~t Delalic et al.




Arrit, par. 32 et 35, << settled precedent >>. voir 6galement
par. 36 « remains >> et « reaffirms >> et par. 48 << long-
standing jurisprudence >.
21 Voir les paragraphes correspondant A l'examen de novo des
616ments du dossier. Arr8t, par. 43, 45-69.
22 Voir les Arrits Ori6 par. 43; Mrkid et glijvan6anin, par.
159; Blagojevi6 et Joki6 par. 189. Je note cependant que
l'affaire Blagojevi6 et Jokid n'a pas entibrement exclu des
consid6rations de mens rea. Voir par. 189 : < La Chambre
d'appel considbre 6galement que, dans la mesure oi cette
finalit6 de l'aide fait implicitement partie int6grante de
l'616ment mat6riel de la complicit6 par aide et encour-
agement, lorsque l'accus6 a sciemment pris part & un crime et
que sa participation a eu un effet important sur sa
perp6tration (. . .) >> [non soulign6 dans l'original].
23
24
Arr~t Blagojevi6 et Joki, par. 189.
A titre d'exemple, il convient de noter que le present arrt
fait 6tat de la maniare dans laquelle Perili6 a distribu6 l'aide
de la VJ A la VRS, ce qui implique n6cessairement une
analyse de la mens rea. Arr~t, par. 66 : << The manner in
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which Perigi6 distributed VJ aid to the VRS also does not
demonstrate specific direction >. Voir 6galement Arret, par.
59 et 61.
25 Arr~t, par. 68 : << However, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu
dissenting, recalls that evidence regarding knowledge of
crimes, alone, does not necessarily establish specific
direction, which is a distinct element of actus reus, separate
from mens rea >>. Voir 6galement Arr~t, par. 48 : << The
Appeals Chamber also underscores that its analysis of
specific direction will exclusively address actus reus et <<
(.. .) the long-standing jurisprudence of the Tribunal affirms
that specific direction is an analytically distinct element of
actus reus >>.
26 Voir par exemple Arr&t, par. 63 : << However, the record
contains no evidence suggesting that the benefits provided to
seconded soldiers and officers - including VJ-level salaries,
housing, and educational and medical benefits - were
tailored to facilitate the commission of crimes. > Voir
6galement Arr8t, par. 65 : << In addition, the Appeals
Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber found that bullets and
shells recovered from crime sites in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
were not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have originated
from the VJ (... .) >> [notes de bas de page omises].
27 Voir les Arr8ts Mrklid et 9ljivandanin, par. 81; Simi, par.
85; Blagkio, par. 48; Blagojevie et Jokie, par. 187; Rukundo,
par. 52; Aleksovski, par. 164.
28 Voir par exemple . les Arrits Gacumbitsi, par. 140;





Arrat, par. 39 et 70.
Arrit, par. 42.
Arr8t Simi6, par. 85, Arr~t Blaiki6, par. 48.
Arr8t, par. 38.
33 La mens rea comprend deux volets, A savoir la connaissance
par l'accus6 des crimes commis par les auteurs principaux
(ou de la probabilit6 qu'ils se commettent) et la connaissance
que les actes de l'accus6 assistent la commission des crimes.
Voir Arrat Mrkli6 et 9lijvandanin, par. 159 : << The aider and
abettor must know that his omission assists in the
commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator. >>; Arrit
Blagkid, par. 49 : << Le fait que le complice sache que ses
actes contribuent A la perp6tration d'un crime par l'auteur
principal suffit A 6tablir I'616ment moral de la complicit6. >>
Voir les Arr8ts Haradinaj, par. 57 : << The aider and abettor
must have knowledge that his or her acts assist in the
commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator. ;
Gotovina et Markad, par. 127 : << The Appeals Chamber first
recalls, as relevant, that for an individual to be held liable for
aiding and abetting, he must have substantially contributed
to a crime and must have known that the acts he performed
assisted the principal perpetrator's crime. >; Blagojevi6 et
Jokid, par. 127 : << L'616ment moral de la complicit6 par aide
et encouragement s'analyse comme le fait pour le complice
de savoir que les actes qu'il accomplit contribuent A la
perp6tration d'un crime pr6cis par l'auteur principal. Dans le
cas de crimes supposant une intention sp6cifique comme la
pers6cution ou le g6nocide, le complice doit connaitre celle
de l'auteur principal. >>
34 Traduction de << PerigiCs relevant actions were intended. >
35 Arr&t, par. 60 : << Having reviewed the relevant evidence, the
Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, also finds no proof
that Perigi6 supported the provision of assistance specifically
directed towards the VRS's criminal activities. Instead,
evidence on the record suggests that Perigid's relevant
actions were intended to aid the VRS's overall war effort. >>
[non soulign6 dans l'original].
36 Voir Arr~t, par. 60 et 61.
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X. ANNEX A - PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The Trial Chamber rendered the Trial Judgement in this case on 6 September 2011. The main aspects of the
appeal proceedings are summarised below.
A. Notice of Appeal and Briefs
2. On 13 September 2011, Perigi6 filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file his notice of appeal,'
which the Prosecution did not oppose.2 Perigi's motion was granted on 16 September 2011, providing him an
extension of 30 days.3 Periid filed his notice of appeal on 8 November 201 1.4 On 21 November 2011, Perigi6 filed
a motion requesting an extension of time to file his appellant's brief,5 which the Prosecution did not oppose.6
Periid's motion was granted on 24 November 2011, providing him an extension of 14 days.7 On 25 January 2012,
Perigid filed a motion requesting an 8,000 word extension to the word limit of his appellant's brief,8 which the
Prosecution did not oppose.9 Perigid's motion was granted on 30 January 2012, and both he and the Prosecution
were granted an 8,000 word extension to the word limits applicable to, respectively, the appellant's brief and the
Prosecution response.10 Periid filed his appellant's brief on 6 February 2012.11 The Prosecution responded to
Perigid's appeal on 19 March 2012.12 Perigi6 filed his reply brief on 3 April 2012.13
B. Assignment of Judges
3. On 14 September 2011, the President of the Tribunal assigned the following Judges to hear the appeal: Judge
Mehmet Giiney; Judge Liu Daqun; Judge Andr6sia Vaz; Judge Theodor Meron; and Judge Carmel Agius.14 Pursuant
to Rule 22(B) of the Rules, Judge Meron was elected the Presiding Judge in the case.' 5 On 16 September 2011,
Judge Meron designated himself as Pre-Appeal Judge.16 On 7 March 2012, the President of the Tribunal replaced Judge
Mehmet Giney with Judge Khalida Rachid Khan.17 On 23 May 2012, the President of the Tribunal replaced Judge
Khalida Rachid Khan with Judge Arlette Ramaroson. 8
C. Status Conferences
4. In accordance with Rule 65bis(B) of the Rules, status conferences were held on 7 March 2012 and 5 July 2012.'9
D. Request to Allow Legal Consultant to Appear Before the Appeals Chamber
5. On 29 October 2012, Perigid sought leave for Mr. St6phane Bourgon to appear before the Appeals Chamber
during the Appeal Hearing.2 0 The Appeals Chamber granted PerigiCs request in a decision delivered orally at the
start of the Appeal Hearing.2 1
E. Appeal Hearing
6. On 24 September 2012, the Appeals Chamber issued a scheduling order for the Appeal Hearing in this case.22
On 15 October 2012, the Appeals Chamber issued an addendum inviting the parties to address several specific issues
at the Appeal Hearing.2 3 The Appeal Hearing was held on 30 October 2012 in The Hague.
ENDNOTES
1 Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Notice of Appeal, 4 Notice of Appeal of Momillo Perigid, 8 November 2011. See also
13 September 2011, para. 14. Conigendum to Mr. Perigid's Notice of Appeal, 7 Febrmay 2012.
2 Prosecution Response to Defence Motion for Extension of 5 Mr. Perigi's Request for an Extension of Time to File his
Time, 15 September 2011, para. 2. Appeal Brief, 21 November 2011, para. 8.
3 Decision on Momailo Perigid's Motion for an Extension of 6 Prosecution Response to Defence Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Notice of Appeal, 16 September 2011, pp. 1-2. Time to File Appeal Brief, 22 November 2011, para. 2.
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7 Decision on Mom6ilo Perigid's Motion for an Extension of
Time to File his Appeal Brief, 24 November 2011, pp. 1-2.
8 Mr. Peri§i's Motion for Leave to Exceed the Word Limit
for the Appeal Brief, 25 January 2012, paras 1, 6, 13.
9 Response to Defence Motion to Exceed Word Limit for
Appeal Brief, 26 January 2012, para. 1.
10 Decision on Mom6ilo Perigid's Motion for Leave to Exceed the
Word Limit for the Appeal Brief, 30 January 2012, pp. 2-3.
11 Appeal Brief of Mom6ilo Perigid, 6 February 2012
(confidential). A final public redacted version was filed on 10
April 2012. See also Book of Authorities for the Appeal
Brief of Mombilo Perigi6, 6 February 2012.
12 Prosecution Response to Mombilo PerigiCs Appeal Brief, 19
March 2012 (confidential). A public redacted version was
filed on 12 April 2012. See also Book of Authorities to
Prosecution Response to Mom6ilo Perigid's Appeal Brief, 19
March 2012.
13 Reply of Mom6ilo Perigid to Prosecution's Response Brief, 3
April 2012 (confidential). A public redacted version was
filed on 7 November 2012. See also Book of Authorities for
the Reply Brief of Mom6ilo Perigid, 3 April 2012.
14 Order Assigning Judges to a Case Before the Appeals
Chamber, 14 September 2011, p. 2.
15 See Order Designating a Pre-Appeal Judge, 16 September
2011, p.1.
16 Order Designating a Pre-Appeal Judge, 16 September 2011, p. 1.
17 Order Replacing a Judge in a Case Before the Appeals
Chamber, 7 March 2012, p. 1.
18 Order Replacing a Judge in a Case Before the Appeals
Chamber, 23 May 2012, p. 1.
19 The parties agreed that certain status conferences need not be
held.
20 Motion on Behalf of Mom6ilo Perigi6 Seeking Permission for a
Legal Consultant to Appear Before the Appeals Chamber
During the 30 October 2012 Appeal Oral Hearing, 29 October
2012 (public with confidential annexes), paras 1, 5.
21 AT. 30 October 2012 p. 11.
22 Scheduling Oder for Appeal Hearing, 24 September 2012, p. 1.
23 Addendum to the Scheduling Order for Appeal Hearing, 15
October 2012, pp. 1-2.
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Oral submissions in the present case, held in The Hague on 30 October 2012
Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal
Appeal Hearing Transcript
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
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and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
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Milan Martid, president of the RSK and Supreme Commander of the SVK
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